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INTRODUCTION 
hose who work in the field of international human rights under-
stand a practical reality: human rights law guarantees fundamental, 
universally agreed-upon rights, except when it doesn’t. Whereas human 
rights represent normative truths, efforts to create remedies for human 
rights violations confront an onerous task of making legal norms a prac-
tical reality. To translate identified right to improved reality, human 
rights advocates must overcome the practical limitations of the world 
they seek to improve. Inept, inefficient, under-resourced, or iniquitous 
governments incapable of, or perhaps even opposed to, assisting citizens’ 
realization of their human rights are a near-constant hurdle. Therefore, 
under the standard account of human rights definition and realization, 
articulating what constitutes a particular human right is relatively easy in 
comparison to the more practical and onerous task of ensuring that gov-
ernments or private actors do not impair—and that they in fact ad-
vance—an individual’s or group’s realization of a defined right. Human 
rights theorists thus recognize a classic gap between rights and reme-
dies.1 
This analytical gap between rights and remedies is perhaps most com-
monly seen in discussions of socio-economic rights, which are second 
generation rights2 constricted, even more than civil or political rights, by 
practical and budgetary realities. The adjudication of socio-economic 
rights violations has been characterized as a jurisprudence of deficien-
cies, viewed by many human rights advocates as all-too-often defined by 
shortcomings and missed opportunities. Recently, for example, when the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa refused to define or endorse a min-
imum core content of the right of access to sufficient water in Mazibuko 
v. City of Johannesburg3—reversing what human rights advocates 
                                                                                                             
 1. See Dinah Shelton, International Human Rights Law: Principled, Double, or 
Absent Standards?, 25 LAW & INEQ. 467, 470–72 (2007); see also Sonja Starr, Rethinking 
‘Effective Remedies:’ Remedial Deterrence in International Courts, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
693, 706–10 (2008); Sanja Djajic, Victims and Promise of Remedies: International Law 
Fairytale Gone Bad, 9 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 329, 332–33 (2008); Ana Maria Merico-
Stephens, Of Federalism, Human Rights, and the Holland Caveat: Congressional Power 
to Implement Treaties, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265, 287 (2004). 
 2. Socioeconomic rights, including the rights articulated in the United Nations Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights and elaborated on in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, are deemed second generation rights, as compared 
with civil and political “first generation” rights. See Frank I. Michelman, The Constitu-
tion, Social Rights, and Liberal Political Justification, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 13, 16 (2003) 
(explaining the oftentimes amorphous distinction between first and second generation 
rights). 
 3. Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg 2009 (3) SA 592 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
T 
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viewed as important progress towards making a socio-economic right 
tangible for South Africans—many advocates lamented yet another set-
back in their quest to make rights a practical reality.4 Some have argued 
that for a country with as progressive a Constitution as South Africa to 
refuse to articulate a baseline, minimum content to a Constitutional right 
(to, in turn, give that right tangible meaning) was a great disappoint-
ment.5 
This Article, however, attaches a different meaning to Mazibuko. It ar-
gues that what was actually evident in Mazibuko, as in many other cases 
involving the adjudication of socio-economic rights, was a phenomenon 
that is hardly foreign: remedial deterrence.6 The practice of remedial de-
terrence is well-established in U.S. constitutional law. When the Su-
preme Court ordered that segregated schools in the South be desegre-
gated “with all deliberate speed,”7 those paradoxical words came to 
represent the constant tension in American jurisprudence between the 
world of the ideal, sounding in foundational rights, and the world of the 
real, implicating practical remedies.8 Similarly, this Article explains that 
in Mazibuko, as well as many other human rights cases (and socio-
economic rights cases in particular), the very nature of the right at issue 
was a product of tangible, practical concerns about implementation of 
attendant remedies. From this perspective, the traditional understanding 
of encapsulable human rights—as distinct from the remedies they impli-
cate—is incorrect. 
Thus, this Article argues that the picture is at once simpler and more 
nuanced than the conventional account of human rights would have us 
                                                                                                             
 4. See, e.g., CENTER FOR APPLIED LEGAL STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF THE 
WITWATERSRAND, http://web.wits.ac.za/Academic/CLM/LAW/CALS (last visited Aug. 
30, 2010) (describing Mazibuko as a “[d]isappointing judgment”); Lindiwe Mazibuko & 
Others v. City of Johannesburg & Others, ESCR-NET, http://www.escr-
net.org/caselaw/caselaw_show.htm?doc_id=1110326 (last visited Feb. 25, 2011); Rachel 
Ordu, Lindiwe Mazibuko and Others v. City of Johannesburg and others: Analysis of the 
Ruling by the Constitutional Court of South Africa (unpublished manuscript), available 
at  http://www.uusc.org/files/Summary_Comments_Mazibuko_Judgment.pdf. 
 5. See, e.g., Peter Danchin, A Human Right to Water? The South African Constitu-
tional Court’s Decision in the Mazibuko Case, EUR. J. INT’L L. BLOG (Jan. 13, 2010), 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/a-human-right-to-water-the-south-african-constitutional-
court%E2%80%99s-decision-in-the-mazibuko-case/ (“the final outcome in Mazibuko has 
no doubt disappointed rights advocates”); sources cited supra note 4. 
 6. See infra note 34 and accompanying text (defining remedial deterrence). 
 7. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
 8. Remedial deterrence is, of course, not limited in U.S. jurisprudence to Brown and 
its progeny. As discussed below, the concept is powerfully evident in recent cases regard-
ing the provision of healthcare services in California’s prison system. See infra notes 
238–41 and accompanying text. 
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believe. Those who view human rights as universal, agreed-upon norms 
and separately inquire about practical, remedial fixes—as this Article 
claims most commentators in fact do—are missing a critical complexity 
in the interplay between rights and remedies. Recognizing this nuance 
enables commentators and tribunals to shed light not only on the reme-
dies available to those whose rights have been violated, but also on the 
content of human rights themselves. Yet understanding rights and reme-
dies together can also be simpler, allowing commentators to set aside 
some of the formalistic distinctions they have created to understand hu-
man rights, particularly socio-economic rights. 
The conventional understanding of human rights parallels the decades-
long prevailing view of U.S. constitutional rights. Writing about U.S. 
constitutional law in the 1970s, for example, Lawrence Sager,9 Ronald 
Dworkin,10 and others,11 have explained the tension between separable 
rights and remedies, spurred by the obvious divide between desegrega-
tion rights and desegregation remedies in Brown v. Board of Education 
and its progeny.12 A range of commentators have sought to make de-
scriptive claims of a divided rights-remedy landscape, oftentimes recog-
nizing deficiencies in U.S. courts’ process of identifying purist rights, but 
corrupting such rights upon translating them into practical remedies.13 
However, this view of separable rights and remedies has been persua-
sively attacked in the domestic context. Daryl Levinson, for example, 
critiques the U.S. constitutional legal theory of “rights essentialism,” a 
practice that commences with judicial recognition of a purist constitu-
tional value.14 Under the rights essentialist model, the normative task of 
“essentializing” is reserved for the judiciary, which is uniquely equipped 
to intuit the true meaning of constitutional values like due process, liber-
ty, or equality.15 These values are corrupted, the essentialist account 
                                                                                                             
 9. See Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Con-
stitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213 (1978). 
 10. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 82–84, 90 (1977) [herei-
nafter DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY]. 
 11. For example, Paul Gewirtz, to a lesser extent, analyzed the discord between rights 
and remedies. See Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 591–92 
(1983). 
 12. Brown, 349 U.S. 294; see also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Guey Heung 
Lee v. Johnson, 404 U.S 1215 (1971); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 
402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
 13. See infra Section IV.C. 
 14. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 857, 859 (1999). 
 15. See Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 
93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 51 (1979) [hereinafter Fiss, Forms of Justice]. Fiss emphasizes 
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goes, when they must be translated into remedies. In this essentialist 
view, remedies inhabit a more pragmatic and functional world, in which 
the constraints of economic, social, political, and other pressures temper 
ideals.16 Levinson and others have pushed back on this essentialist mod-
el. They underscore the great disconnect between rights essentialism dis-
course and the true character of constitutional adjudication, claiming that 
a more perspicuous view of U.S. constitutional law reveals a dynamic 
and bi-directional remedial process—wherein considerations of remedies 
affect rights determinations and vice versa. This argument builds on the 
notion of “remedial deterrence,” which holds that courts are dissuaded 
from recognizing a particular right because of the necessary remedy they 
would have to institute. Levinson further develops this concept by dis-
cussing “remedial equilibration”—in a nutshell, the notion that constitu-
tional rights are affected by, and are indivisible from, remedies.17 
Surprisingly, unlike U.S. constitutional law and areas of private law 
such as contracts,18 in which commentators have argued for a more 
thoughtful understanding of the nuanced relationship between rights and 
remedies and then a better equilibration of the two, commentators have 
devoted scant academic effort to analyzing the interdependent roles of 
rights and remedies in human rights discourse.19 In the socio-economic 
rights context, for example, academics have exhaustively debated wheth-
er courts have employed weak- versus strong-form review of legislative 
action that has led to alleged rights deprivations (as well as whether 
courts should recognize a minimum core of rights from which one cannot 
                                                                                                             
structural reform litigation and its propensity to establish rights as pure truths, while re-
medies are reserved to a subservient and secondary role. See id. 
 16. Rights essentialist scholars have observed that courts often reserve the pragmatic 
task of allocating remedies to elected officials—to a congress that is accustomed to tem-
pering its ideals in light of pragmatic and policy-based constraints. 
 17. See Levinson, supra note 14, at 884. Levinson first defined “remedial equilibra-
tion” with respect to U.S. constitutional adjudication. 
 18. The incongruous relationship between rights and remedies that Levinson has ar-
gued against in U.S. constitutional law does not exist in all areas of U.S. law, such as in 
contract law’s premise of an efficient breach, in which the costs of compliance with a 
commitment outweigh the benefits of holding steadfast to that same commitment. Con-
tract liability rules are not seen as prohibiting breach, with remedies serving to enforce 
this prohibition. See id. at 859. Instead, this Article understands contractual obligations as 
the dividing line between performing or breaching at a particular price—the price being 
the remedy of damages or, in certain instances, specific performance. See id. 
 19. Perhaps the closest discussion to that presented in this Article is the compelling 
argument made by Sonja Starr, who also has considered remedial deterrence in the con-
text of human rights, but has focused exclusively on international criminal courts and 
their unique institutional constraints. See Starr, supra note 1. 
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deviate).20 However, these commentators do not appear to have made 
any serious efforts to discredit the prevailing rights essentialism that 
permeates descriptive accounts of socio-economic rights. 
Though acknowledging the prevailing human rights debates, this Ar-
ticle argues that academics and practitioners working in human rights 
law must more closely investigate the overly-simplistic theory of judicial 
rights essentialism. The related claim is that this investigation must occur 
before commentators can overcome the prevailing, constrictive under-
standing of human rights and erect a more resonant, harmonious view of 
the jurisprudence of rights and remedies, in which rights and remedies 
are inevitably interdependent and mutually defining. 
In some ways, this Article’s primary claim should be unsurprising. 
Law mediates—it accepts compromise as unavoidable given that law 
both idealizes and seeks pragmatism in a world filled with constraints. 
Therefore, applying remedial equilibration to human rights, arguably, 
clarifies how courts confronted with the daunting task of having to reme-
dy human rights deprivations oftentimes engage in an artful exercise of 
remedial deterrence. Remedial equilibration makes clear that these courts 
balance a variety of interests in order to achieve a tempered remedy that 
is loosely calculated to optimize a range of interests. 
In addition, while the Article addresses human rights broadly, its core 
insight is a particularly important component of a proper descriptive un-
derstanding of socio-economic rights adjudication. The focus here fre-
quently returns to socio-economic rights for two reasons, one practical 
and the other theoretical. Both reasons relate to the fact that such rights 
are already aspirational and accepting of many forms of compromise in 
their progressive realization. If, for example, a concrete right to equal 
treatment is subject to remedial deterrence and is, therefore, not imme-
diately enforceable, how much more so is a more amorphous socio-
economic right that must be achieved “progressively”—by no clearly 
determined speed or pathway—subject to the same fate? Thus, the prac-
tical reason for focusing on socio-economic rights is that to the extent 
that theorists (or practitioners) are uncomfortable with thinking about 
human rights as being inherently limited by an attendant remedy, such 
discomfort should be lessened in the context of socio-economic rights in 
which compromises recognizing limited resources are already common-
place. 
Second, remedial deterrence fits more squarely within the theoretical 
framework that adjudicatory bodies use to consider socio-economic 
rights. Put another way, once commentators more fully recognize re-
                                                                                                             
 20. See discussion infra Part III. 
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medial deterrence as an exacting force within the adjudication of socio-
economic rights, they can direct their attention to more fruitful analytical 
endeavors, such as clearly articulating to a reviewing court—and having 
the court acknowledge and reiterate in turn—the variety of interests at 
stake and the attendant costs in adjudicating a right. Because this interac-
tion is more likely to occur in the socio-economic rights context, a 
second goal of this Article is to begin the task of more thoughtfully un-
derstanding the rights-remedies relationship in socio-economic rights 
jurisprudence. 
Finally, in discussing the interplay of rights and remedies with socio-
economic rights, further insights may be gleaned about the applicability 
of remedial equilibration in all forms of human rights adjudication. For 
example, as the understanding of remedial equilibration and socio-
economic rights becomes more robust, there may be further insights into 
other types of human rights, such as civil and political rights, and it is for 
this reason that this Article alludes to human rights more broadly in 
much of its discussion. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes rights essentialism, 
remedial deterrence, and remedial equilibration, laying the groundwork 
for later claims that these concepts are sorely lacking in human rights—
and particularly socio-economic rights—discourse. Part II demonstrates 
that rights essentialism pervades the conventional understanding of so-
cio-economic rights in both “minimum core” and “reasonableness” di-
alogues. Despite impassioned debates regarding the “minimum core” 
versus “reasonableness” approaches to rights, the two competing concep-
tions ultimately suffer from similar deficiencies in that both seek to iden-
tify pure and idealistic rights that are separate from remedies. 
Turning to remedies, Part III explores various conceptions of remedies, 
ranging from strong-form review to weak-form review, all of which fol-
low a uni-directional path of causation, wherein the already identified 
and defined right leads to a particular remedy which is, in turn, often-
times tempered by political or economic realities. This path-dependent, 
“define the right, apply the remedy” thinking proceeds from an essential-
ist view of rights that separates rights from remedial considerations. 
Therefore, Part IV offers an alternative way in which rights and remedies 
can be “equilibrated,” or harmonized, highlighting several examples of 
remedial deterrence—or more broadly remedial equilibration—moving 
from U.S. constitutional law to human rights jurisprudence. Finally, Part 
V explores the implications of such a new and perspicuously framed ap-
proach, with an emphasis on understanding that remedial concerns per-
meate efforts to define the content of socio-economic rights; reconsider-
ing the institutional division of labor between branches of government if 
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courts alone do not define rights; finding the proper place for courts in 
this new understanding of human rights; and recognizing the importance 
of judicial transparency and candor as courts and international tribunals 
seek to create more resonance between rights and remedies. Ultimately, 
this Article begins the task of more thoughtfully understanding the 
rights-remedies relationship in human rights—and particularly socio-
economic rights—jurisprudence. 
I. RIGHTS ESSENTIALISM, REMEDIAL DETERRENCE, AND REMEDIAL 
EQUILIBRATION 
“Rights essentialism” is one of the most basic and long-standing cha-
racterizations of constitutional adjudication.21 Rights essentialism as-
sumes a specific order of events in courts’ application of constitutional 
rules. Under rights essentialism, judges first identify a pure right with 
intrinsic value.22 Judges may understand the value of the right based on 
the right’s connection to some privileged and respected source, such as 
the right’s articulation in the Constitution—the supreme law of the 
land.23 Courts are uniquely empowered to discern such rights, perhaps 
because of their relative insulation from political pressures or because of 
their enhanced ability to discern legal principles.24 
Next, under rights essentialism, the pure right is subsequently distorted 
and diminished when it confronts the practical certainties of the world.25 
Rights essentialism thus creates an attendant institutional division of la-
bor between rights and remedies. It holds that remedies are “contingent 
facts,” requiring superior fact-finding as well as interest and cost-benefit 
balancing.26 Balancing interests and costs and benefits, in turn, requires 
political accountability to those with relevant interests.27 Therefore, the 
legislative and executive branches typically guide the implementation of 
rights.28 Under rights essentialism, courts properly defer to these 
branches to do so.29 
                                                                                                             
 21. See Levinson, supra note 14, at 858 (deeming a certain way of evaluating consti-
tutional rights, “rights essentialism”). 
 22. Id. at 858. 
 23. Id. at 861. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See id. 
 26. See id. 
 27. Those with relevant interests may include the parties before a court adjudicating 
an alleged rights deprivation, as well as other persons or groups who may be affected 
positively or negatively by the court’s rendered decision. 
 28. For example, in Mazibuko, the legislature in South Africa adopted a significant 
piece of legislation three years after the country achieved democracy—the Water Servic-
es Act (the “Act” or the “Water Services Act”)—to help provide tangible meaning to 
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As Daryl Levinson astutely points out, the core assumptions of rights 
essentialism seem strange when stated expressly and contextually.30 The 
notion of such a rigid institutional division of labor appears unconvincing 
given that multiple branches of government help shape policies and prac-
tices, such as those ensuring access to water, education, or healthcare. 
Furthermore, the conception of an austere divide between rights and re-
medies seems overly simplistic given that definitions of rights and reme-
dies continue to evolve, like the dynamic world they occupy. Yet, the 
rights essentialism conception is a viable and prevalent one in scholarly 
analysis. Despite its wide disconnect from the actual practice of rights 
adjudication, the scholarly approach and characterization have endured 
as deeply ingrained in the conventional conception of human rights 
law.31 This Article contests the assumptions underlying the rights essen-
tialist account. 
In Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court explained the bedrock le-
gal principle that where there is a right, there is also a remedy.32 Despite 
this legal maxim, institutional constraints and collateral costs may un-
dermine the enforcement of rights. In some instances, overwhelming 
costs may make it impractical or infeasible for courts to institute a par-
ticular remedy. Courts may avoid these costs by creating procedural hur-
dles that prevent adjudication of the legal claim, narrowing their interpre-
tation of the substantive basis of a legal right, or requiring a heightened 
showing in order to prove a substantive rights violation.33 All of these 
responses, individually and collectively, comprise what is known as “re-
medial deterrence.”34 In its most simplistic articulation, remedial deter-
rence takes place when the costs of a remedy deter a court from realizing 
                                                                                                             
people’s constitutional right to have access to a basic water supply. See generally City of 
Johannesburg v. Mazibuko 2009 SACLR LEXIS 12, at *10–12, *17–18 (S. Afr.). 
 29. See Levinson, supra note 14, at 861. 
 30. See id. at 858. 
 31. See id. 
 32. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162–63 (1803) (quoting Black-
stone in his statement that “it is a general and indisputable rule that where there is a legal 
right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law whenever that right is in-
vaded.”). 
 33. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 14, at 884–85 (providing, as an example, that if 
the structural reform of prisons will require too much judicial oversight, one might expect 
to see courts respond to this challenge by narrowing the associated substantive right by, 
for example, requiring a showing of “deliberate indifference” of prison officials). 
 34. See id. Levinson’s formative article evaluated the effects of remedial deterrence 
on the interpretation of rights, as seen through structural reform litigation under U.S. 
constitutional law. This Article analyzes “remedial deterrence” in the context of socio-
economic rights adjudication. 
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a right.35 Unlike in the rights essentialist account, under remedial deter-
rence, rights do not exist in a distinct realm from remedies; rather, when 
courts fail to defend a right by providing a remedy, they necessarily alter 
the right itself.36 
As applied to human rights adjudication, courts may engage in remedi-
al deterrence when they avoid providing a tangible remedy to a rights 
deprivation because of the collateral costs—whether economic, social, 
political, or otherwise.37 As foreign courts and international tribunals 
grapple with providing tangible relief to broad-sweeping socio-economic 
rights, such as the rights to health, education, and housing, the collateral 
costs can be quite high. One might, then, expect to find a heightened in-
cidence of remedial deterrence in exactly these types of rights-
vindicating operations that will require large outlays of capital and other 
resources on the part of government. Perhaps, as a consequence of the 
economic challenges of providing for socio-economic rights as well as 
the ingrained conception of these rights as second generation rights,38 
commentators and practitioners may be more accepting of remedial de-
terrence in the socio-economic rights context (as compared to the civil 
and political rights context).39 
Internationally or domestically, remedial deterrence is unavoidable. 
Despite attempts to insulate courts from political and other pressures, 
courts inevitably confront pragmatic limitations preventing them from 
instituting overly costly remedies. Moreover, a fully effective and com-
prehensive remedy may be unavailable for a range of reasons. The enter-
prise of providing a full remedy is complex.40 Courts may confront mul-
tiple remedial goals that require conflicting programs of action. For ex-
ample, a court adjudicating a violation of the right to health may have the 
goal of vindicating the harm to the applicant before the court—a task that 
may require accounting for a history of deprivations of the right to health 
and other interrelated rights. The court may also have the goal of achiev-
ing an equitable and non-discriminatory approach to the right to health 
                                                                                                             
 35. See Starr, supra note 1, at 695. 
 36. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 14, at 858. 
 37. See Lisa J. Laplante, The Law of Remedies and the Clean Hands Doctrine: Exclu-
sionary Reparation Policies in Peru’s Political Transition, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 51, 
56–57 (2007). In considering the statement that “where there is a right there is a reme-
dy”—or ubi ius ibi remedium—Sonja Starr has critiqued this “full remedy rule,” or at 
least the strongest version of it, noting that “strong remedial rules actually undermine 
effective rights enforcement in some areas.” Starr, supra note 1, at 708. 
 38. See supra note 2. 
 39. Cf. Starr, supra note 1, at 711–19 (rejecting remedial deterrence as related to in-
ternational criminal procedure). 
 40. See Gewirtz, supra note 11, at 593–94. 
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on behalf of persons not currently before the court. These goals may be 
irreconcilable, requiring judicial balancing.41 
Instrumental deficiencies may also contribute to remedial deterrence.42 
Real-world limitations may make it impossible to create a perfect reme-
dy. Courts frequently confront imperfect knowledge about social institu-
tions, complicated analyses of how to effect change in these institutions, 
a dependency on other branches of government and actors to help effect 
a remedial program, and unanticipated changes that alter the factual 
background against which courts must prescribe a remedy.43 As a result, 
even if a full remedy can ultimately be achieved, a victim may already 
have suffered the complete extent of harm before the full remedy be-
comes available, and a court may adjust the right accordingly to account 
for this limitation. 
In contrast to rights essentialism, the theory of remedial deterrence 
does not maintain that courts sidestep realizing a right, which remains 
uncorrupted despite the failure to realize it in the real world. Rather, as 
courts refrain from vindicating a right, under remedial deterrence they 
necessarily affect the very nature of the right.44 Remedial deterrence thus 
lacks the disconnect that characterizes rights essentialism.45 Rights and 
remedies exist, in this view, as part of a symbiotic relationship. This un-
derstanding is also a central tenet of “remedial equilibration”—in a nut-
shell, the notion that constitutional rights are affected by, and are indivis-
ible from, remedies.46 Daryl Levinson first defined “remedial equilibra-
tion” as encompassing various forms of interrelationships between rights 
and remedies, with the most obvious form being that of “remedial deter-
rence”—i.e. that rights can be shaped by the very nature of the remedy 
that will be applied if a court determines that the right has been vi-
olated.47 Under this most-recognized form of interrelationship, courts 
shape the definition of a right when they craft a remedy.48 If a de facto 
interpretation of a particular socio-economic right requires that govern-
ment officials take a certain course of action, such as expanding access to 
a drug or granting social support services to a category of persons, then 
                                                                                                             
 41. See id. 
 42. See id. at 596. 
 43. See id. 
 44. See id. at 598 (noting that rights are dependent on remedies for their very exis-
tence). 
 45. See id. at 862. 
 46. See Levinson, supra note 14, at 884. Levinson first defined “remedial equilibra-
tion” with respect to U.S. constitutional adjudication. 
 47. See id. at 884–85. 
 48. See id. at 884. 
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one may expect that a court will find any de jure governmental program 
that runs afoul of these guidelines to be unconstitutional.49 
Further, in an exercise Levinson describes as “remedial incorporation,” 
a remedy may also affect a right when the right itself incorporates a re-
medy, as in the case of an equitable remedy like an injunction.50 Preven-
tive injunctions are oftentimes prophylactic instruments that require a 
certain course of governmental conduct. Consider the following hypo-
thetical example: In adjudicating a violation of the right to health, a court 
may order the government to take a specific course of action in order to 
provide appropriate health care. In issuing this prophylactic remedy, 
however, the court also broadens the scope of the substantive right to 
include an entitlement to the same prophylactic remedy—the prescribed 
type of health care services. Many courts have such powers. The Consti-
tutional Court of South Africa, for example, has emphasized in its juri-
sprudence that it has broad remedial authority, which allows it to issue 
supervisory injunctions.51 In this way, rights and remedies operate in a 
symbiotic manner. Finally, Levinson offers “remedial substantiation.” In 
the most basic sense, remedial substantiation recognizes that the mone-
tary value of a right is oftentimes simply the value of the remedy the 
court will offer if it finds that the right was violated.52 
Examples of structural reform litigation in the United States illustrate 
the significance of considering the line of causation as running from re-
medies to rights rather than only from rights to remedies.53 As seen do-
mestically in California’s recent prison reform litigation, concerns about 
the practical availability of remedies will routinely impact rights, as 
courts redefine rights in light of anticipated remedial limitations.54 Thus, 
in a series of rulings addressing challenges to conditions in California’s 
prisons, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California 
engaged in remedial incorporation when it first expanded prisoners’ 
rights to medical care to include a preventive injunction that ordered the 
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) to 
                                                                                                             
 49. See id. (applying this line of analysis to domestic structural reform litigation). 
 50. See id. at 885. 
 51. See Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) 
paras. 96–114 (S. Afr.). The court emphasized, “Section 38 of the Constitution contem-
plates that where it is established that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed a 
court will grant ‘appropriate relief.’ It has wide powers to do so and in addition to the 
declaration that it is obliged to make in terms of section 172(1)(a) a court may also ‘make 
any order that is just and equitable.’”  Id. para. 101. 
 52. See Levinson, supra note 14, at 887. 
 53. See id. at 884. 
 54. See id. 
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provide a minimum threshold of medical care.55 Three years later, the 
court found that appalling conditions remained despite its preventive in-
junction, after balancing the range of interests, the court placed the 
CDCR health care delivery system in receivership,56 thereby influencing 
the ultimate value and character of the prisoners’ underlying right to 
medical care. 
Remedial equilibration is important because it offers an alternate, more 
holistic view of human rights jurisprudence in which rights and remedies 
operate in a symbiotic relationship. When one views human rights law—
and socio-economic rights in particular—through this new lens, the here-
tofore accepted doctrinal foundation cracks, yielding room for more 
analysis of the interplay between rights and remedies. This new theoreti-
cal understanding of socio-economic rights is also more conceptually 
analogous to areas of private law in which rights and remedies are an 
operative single package. For example, contract law presumes an effi-
cient breach that occurs where the costs of upholding a commitment ex-
ceed the benefits of maintaining the commitment.57 Contract liability 
rules do not forbid contractual breach; similarly, remedies enforce no 
such prohibition.58 Instead, contractual obligations allow for an efficient 
breach. A person upholds contractual obligations at a certain price—the 
price being the remedy of damages or, in certain instances, specific per-
formance.59 The analogy between human rights law and private law can-
not and should not be perfect, as there are important distinctions between 
the two. The optimum level of breach for human rights may be zero or 
close to zero, whereas such limitations may not surround private law en-
titlements. Nonetheless, private law can provide an important theoretical 
frame of reference from which to challenge long-standing conceptions of 
the rights and remedies divide in human rights jurisprudence. 
Viewing human rights in this progressive way has other important im-
plications. Once commentators and theorists understand the powerful 
role that remedial deterrence plays in adjudicating human rights in both 
national courts and international tribunals, they can focus attention on 
more rewarding, practical endeavors, such as those discussed in Part V. 
Thus, the Article turns to socio-economic rights to set the stage for re-
medial equilibration in human rights. 
                                                                                                             
 55. Stipulation for Injunctive Relief, Plata v. Davis, No. C-01-1351 (TEH) (N.D. Cal. 
June 13, 2002). 
 56. Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351 (THE), 2005 WL 2932253 (N.D. Cal. 
Oct. 3, 2005). 
 57. See Levinson, supra note 14, at 859. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
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II. THEORIES OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS 
Practitioners, commentators, judges, and theorists often laud socio-
economic rights as pure, essentialist entities insulated from the trade-offs 
typically recognized in public policy. Indeed, socio-economic rights ex-
press important, normative values that the international community and 
state actors have subsequently enacted in national constitutions60 and 
international treaties.61 But, concomitantly, the jurisprudence of socio-
economic rights is often characterized by imprecision and obscurities.62 
Despite the fact that socio-economic rights embody universal values, the 
rights have had a regrettably indeterminate practical content. In other 
words, commentators and practitioners understand and celebrate socio-
economic rights as the embodiment of universally agreed-upon norms, as 
well as a normative good, but taking the outer lines the rights provide 
and coloring in the remedies has proven difficult.63 In the face of such 
indeterminacy, multiple actors have attempted to bring analytical rigor to 
bear, arguing for competing conceptions of the basic socio-economic 
rights and freedoms to which all people are entitled. 
There are two primary, competing conceptions of socio-economic 
rights: one embracing a resolute “minimum content” of rights and the 
other defining rights according to what is “reasonable.” Both are analyti-
cally deficient, however, in that they assume that rights exist in a concep-
tual silo and devote insufficient attention to remedies.64 Despite the sig-
                                                                                                             
 60. See, e.g., CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.]; CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA 
DE ECUADOR [C.P.]; CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA 1992; S. AFR. CONST., 
1996. 
 61. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]; Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter 
CEDAW]; Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [he-
reinafter International Convention on the Rights of the Child]; African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217. Treaty bodies established under 
certain international treaties’ charters have, in turn, sought to articulate the content of the 
rights included therein through general recommendations, concluding observations, and 
comments made to States Parties when they submit their State Party reports to the respec-
tive conventions. These treaty bodies include the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 
and the Committee on the Rights of the Child. 
 62. See, e.g., Marius Pieterse, Eating Socioeconomic Rights: The Usefulness of Rights 
Talk in Alleviating Social Hardship Revisited, 29 HUM. RTS. Q. 3, 796, 798–99 (2007); 
Sandra Liebenberg, The Value of Human Dignity in Interpreting Socio-Economic Rights, 
21 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 1 (2005). 
 63. See David B. Hunter, Human Rights Implications for Climate Change Negotia-
tions, 11 OR. REV. INT’L L. 331, 332 (2009). 
 64. See infra notes 199–280 and accompanying text. 
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nificant debates over the competing conceptions of socio-economic 
rights, both of the prevailing conceptions also lack any self-
consciousness regarding their own propensities to “essentialize” rights, 
and both neglect to consider the powerful ways in which the rights are 
influenced by, and in turn influence, remedies.65 
A. The “Minimum Core” 
A long-running goal of commentators and tribunals examining socio-
economic rights has been to define the rights’ “minimum core.” The min-
                                                                                                             
 65. Although not intending to diminish the importance of cultural rights, this Article 
does not extend its analysis to this category of rights. First, as a practical matter, this 
Article aims to debunk a rigid distinction between the two leading conceptions of socio-
economic rights, and fewer debates have focused on propounding a conception of cultural 
rights, making the argument less valuable in that context. The wealth of human rights 
case law and academic discourse to date has been centered on social and economic rights, 
with cultural rights largely unexplored. See, e.g., JESSICA ALMQVIST, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
IN PERSPECTIVE: HUMAN RIGHTS, CULTURE AND THE RULE OF LAW ch. 3 (2005) (discuss-
ing how human rights law has been inadequate in addressing issues related to culture); 
Asbjorn Eide, Cultural Rights as Individual Human Rights, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND 
CULTURAL RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK 169, 289 (Asbjorn Eide, Catarina Krause & Allen Rosas 
eds., 2d ed. 2001) (assessing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the ICESCR 
and related commentary, and concluding that cultural rights appears as “almost a remnant 
category” of rights); Katharine G. Young, The Minimum Core of Economic and Social 
Rights: A Concept in Search of Content, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 113, 119 (2008). Although 
this neglect calls for further treatment, critical theory may well need to separate characte-
rizations of social and economic rights from those of cultural rights based upon the dis-
tinct political challenges that they pose. See NANCY FRASER & AXEL HONNETH, 
REDISTRIBUTION OR RECOGNITION? A POLITICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL EXCHANGE (2003); see 
also Andreas Huyssen, Natural Rights, Cultural Rights, and the Politics of Memory, 
HEMISPHERIC INST. OF PERFORMANCE & POLITICS, http://hemi.nyu.edu/hemi/en/e-
misferica-62/huyssen (last visited Feb. 25, 2011). This is especially true given that the 
challenges of social and economic rights are typically those of addressing redistribution 
of resources, whereas cultural rights address and recognize the rights of certain groups of 
individuals. See Young, supra note 65, at 119. Furthermore, from a pragmatic standpoint, 
social and economic rights dialogue is centered on the individual—the rights of each 
individual are recognized irrespective of group affiliation. However, the expression of 
cultural rights may require an emphasis on the minority group and may ultimately harm 
individual rights by creating or maintaining distributions of resources that are facially 
unequal. See id. at 119–20 (providing an example of how women operating in the private 
sphere may confront the consequences of this living tension); see also SUSAN MOLLER 
OKIN, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN 7, 
9 (Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard & Martha Nussbaum eds., 1999). Analysis is limited 
to the ways in which rights and remedies have been incongruously defined in the context 
of redistributing resources on an individual basis, and, therefore, discussion of how rights 
and remedies are defined and realized in the context of cultural rights is reserved for a 
later date. 
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imum core articulation seeks to ascertain, or in some cases prescribe, the 
minimum content that comprises a particular right.66 As one commenta-
tor notes, “it is a concept trimmed, honed, and shorn of deontological 
excess.”67 Minimum core adherents theorize that by articulating a con-
crete minimum content to a certain right, it is possible to achieve maxi-
mum gains in realizing the right, as deviations will be more easily ascer-
tained.68 Yet, the view of socio-economic rights as containing a mini-
mum core—like any other conception of socio-economic rights—has its 
limitations, leading commentators to provide a wealth of criticism. 
Critics argue that those who believe they can discern a discrete content 
of a particular socio-economic right envision a precision that simply does 
not exist.69 Others criticize that through the act of defining a concrete 
minimum threshold for a right, proponents of the minimum core forsake 
broader goals of socio-economic rights, which are to aim for more than a 
bare minimum, and inappropriately lead judges to make utilitarian trade-
offs.70 Critics similarly maintain that a minimum core conception of so-
cio-economic rights focuses unfair attention on developing countries and 
their shortfalls while giving a free-ride to many middle- and high-income 
countries that have been underperforming by their own relative stan-
dards.71 But despite the criticisms, the minimum core conception of so-
                                                                                                             
 66. See generally Young, supra note 65. Young’s article canvases the various domi-
nant conceptions of the minimum core of social and economic rights and ultimately con-
cludes that all of the conceptions fail to deliver a determinate core of rights. 
 67. See id. at 113. 
 68. See id.; Peter Danchin, A Human Right to Water? The South African Constitu-
tional Court’s Decision in the Mazibuko Case, EUR. J. INT’L L. BLOG (Jan. 13, 2010), 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/a-human-right-to-water-the-south-african-constitutional-
court%E2%80%99s-decision-in-the-mazibuko-case/. 
 69. See, e.g., Young, supra note 65, at 113; ROBERT E. GOODWIN & PHILIP PETTIT, 
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN ANTHOLOGY 354–56 (2006) (noting that 
moral consensus is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve in a nonparochial and culturally 
neutral manner); Brigit Toebes, The Right to Health, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND 
CULTURAL RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK 169, 176 (Asbjorn Eidie, Catarina Krause & Allen Ro-
sas eds., 2d ed. 2001). 
 70. See, e.g., Karin Lehmann, In Defense of the Constitutional Court: Litigating So-
cio-Economic Rights and the Myth of the Minimum Core, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 163, 
190–91 (2006). 
 71. See MATTHEW CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL 
AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DEVELOPMENT 152 (1995). Certain scho-
lars have tried to resolve this tension by articulating a state-specific core minimum, as 
well as an absolute core minimum. See, e.g., Craig Scott & Philip Alston, Adjudicating 
Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context a Comment on Soobramooney’s 
Legacy and Grootboom’s Promise, 16 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 206, 250 (2000) (noting that 
“Canada’s core minimum will go considerably beyond the absolute core minimum while 
Mali’s may go no further than this absolute core”). 
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cio-economic rights remains influential and, really, one of the two ways 
most tribunals and commentators conceptualize such rights. The follow-
ing Sections outline the background of the “minimum core” conception, 
its theoretical progeny, and its criticisms, before proceeding to analyze 
minimum core discourse based upon its failure to consider remedial inte-
ractions and interdependencies. 
1. The Minimum Core—Background 
The concept of the “minimum core” has historical connections to con-
stitutional principles. It inherits its structure from German basic law, 
which protects the essential content of a constitutional right from poten-
tial limitation.72 Many constitutions include structural references to a 
core, pure, or essential component of a right that cannot be infringed or 
derogated, either as part of the articulated constitutional right itself or via 
a constitutional limitation clause.73 
The United Nations Committee on Economic and Social Rights (“the 
Committee”) was the first international body to articulate the notion of a 
minimum core and it powerfully did so beginning in the early 1990s, 
analogizing the minimum core to a conception of strict liability. The 
Committee states in its General Comment 3: 
[A] minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very 
least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon 
every State party. Thus, for example, a State party in which any signifi-
cant number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essen-
tial primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most ba-
sic forms of education, is prima facie, failing to discharge its obliga-
tions under the Covenant.74 
The Committee’s early pronouncements, therefore, firmly established 
that a State Party prima facie derogates socio-economic rights when it 
                                                                                                             
 72. See Young, supra note 65, at 124. Young also notes that scholars such as Esin 
Orucu have traced the core rights formulation to the Turkish Constitution of 1961. Id. 
 73. See id. at 124; see also Fons Coomans, Some Introductory Remarks on the Justi-
ciability of Economic and Social Rights in a Comparative Constitutional Context, in 
JUSTICIABILITY OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS: EXPERIENCES FROM DOMESTIC 
SYSTEMS 1, 9–13 (Fons Coomans ed., 2006) (providing an overview of employment of 
the minimum conception of socio-economic rights of countries such as India, Hungary, 
and Spain). But see generally City of Johannesburg v. Mazibuko, 2009 SACLR LEXIS 
12 at *10–12, *17–18 (S. Afr.) (firmly rejecting the conception of a minimum core for 
the right to water under the South African Constitution but, nonetheless, reaching a closer 
conception to the minimum core than most other courts in their adjudication of rights). 
 74. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3, art. 2, ¶ 1, 
U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990) [hereinafter General Comment No. 3]. 
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disregards their “essential” components. Further, in promulgating its 
General Comment on the right to the highest attainable standard of health 
under Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (“the Covenant”), the Committee states that “a State par-
ty cannot, under any circumstances whatsoever, justify its non-
compliance with . . . core obligations . . . which are non-
derogable . . . .”75 Many human rights advocates have adopted this un-
derstanding of socio-economic rights, arguing that this conception is the 
most immediate and enforceable way in which to achieve their realiza-
tion.76 Indeed, the minimum core concept does hold appeal in that it pur-
ports to establish rigor and accountability for government action that 
some observers may otherwise see as absent. Yet despite the superficial 
appeal of this essentialist view of socio-economic rights, the minimum 
core conception is tragically ineffectual at resolving the inherent ten-
sions, challenges, and limitations in the implementation of social and 
economic rights.77 
In a more optimistic view, the minimum core approach retains some 
redeeming value. Notably, this conception of socio-economic rights can 
provide a common platform from which states can embark on the “pro-
gressive realization” of these rights as outlined under international law. 
Under the Covenant, for example, the larger goal of providing for the 
right to health is one that is to be achieved “progressively,” taking into 
account the institutional and economic limitations of the State Party. Ar-
ticle 2 of the Covenant imposes a duty on a State Party to take steps “to 
the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving pro-
gressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Co-
venant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of 
legislative measures.”78 Under this more nuanced view, the minimum 
core may lay a foundation for a State Party’s journey in progressively 
meeting its legal commitment to provide for social and economic rights. 
Further, the minimum core content of a particular right may also fore-
tell the steps the progressive realization effort should follow. This influ-
                                                                                                             
 75. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14, art. 12, ¶ 47, 
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2004 (Aug. 11, 2000). 
 76. These advocates have also argued that the minimum core concept provides an 
important benchmark against which both citizens and interested international parties can 
measure a government’s performance and hold it accountable for its results. See Young, 
supra note 65, at 115; see also Theunis Roux, Understanding Grootboom—A Response to 
Cass Sunstein, 12 CONST. FORUM 41, 46–47 (2002). 
 77. See Young, supra note 65, at 115 (calling the minimum core conception “hope-
lessly incompatible in practice”). 
 78. ICESCR, supra note 61, art. 2. 
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ence is apparent in the principle of non-discrimination that applies im-
mediately to a State Party’s provision of social and economic rights, such 
as the right to health. The Committee emphasizes that “while the Cove-
nant provides for progressive realization and acknowledges the con-
straints due to the limits of available resources, it also imposes various 
obligations which are of immediate effect. . . . [Of these] is the ‘under-
taking to guarantee’ that relevant rights ‘will be exercised without dis-
crimination.’”79 Hence, under Article 12 of the Covenant, a State Party 
need not provide for the complete right to health at the outset, but it can-
not discriminate in its provision of health services. In this sense, the min-
imum core—although it does not intrinsically describe the path a state 
must follow in realizing social and economic rights—outlines principles 
that must apply across the journey.80 
2. The Minimum Core—Theoretical Progeny 
The minimum core conception has generated significant definitional 
debate, being subdivided into different articulations of what precisely 
constitutes this minimum core of socio-economic rights. Commentators 
categorize competing definitions of the minimum core of rights under the 
belief that by better understanding the content of socio-economic rights, 
the international community can then discern the optimal means to real-
ize those rights.81 These analyses have largely been limited to examining 
rights as aspirational truths, leaving others to grapple with the practical 
limitations of rights realization in resource-limited states. Importantly, as 
explained in this Section, despite the distinctions between the minimum 
core definitions, all of the leading explanations adopt a myopic approach 
                                                                                                             
 79. General Comment No. 3, supra note 74. 
 80. One could argue that the minimum core, in fact, incorporates a distinct, indepen-
dent right to non-discrimination, akin to the right equal protection under U.S. constitu-
tional law. The authors think the minimum core concept is, instead, most significant for 
mandating a core of the right that must be exercised without discrimination because the 
Covenant does not allow no progress to be made in providing health while, in turn, re-
quiring that if progress is made it be done in a non-discriminatory manner—a position 
that would be more consistent with a pure and independent equal protection right. In-
stead, it requires that some services be provided immediately and others be provided—or 
realized—progressively, and it holds that in progressively realizing this right, states are 
bound by a principle of non-discrimination. See ICESCR, supra note 64, art. 2. As such, 
it goes beyond a pure non-discrimination or equal protection right. 
 81. See generally Young, supra note 65; Joie Chowdhury, Judicial Adherence to a 
Minimum Core Approach to Socio-Economic Rights—A Comparative Perspective (Cor-
nell Law. Sch. Inter-Univ. Graduate Student Conference Papers, Working Paper No. 27, 
Mar. 23, 2009), available at 
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1055&context=lps_clacp. 
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of essentializing rights while disregarding the attendant and intercon-
nected remedies. 
One theoretical approach to the minimum core conception of socio-
economic rights proceeds by seeking to understand the “essential mini-
mum” of a particular right.82 Proponents of this approach query the es-
sential minimum elements of a right by virtue of their relationship to a 
particular foundational norm.83 Notably, what begins as a purportedly 
rigorous methodology quickly reduces to a normative exercise, through 
which foundational norms like life, survival, or dignity are propounded 
as fundamentally important.84 The minimum core is then defined as a 
tiered hierarchy of rights, with a nucleus that is the foundational norm; 
other socio-economic rights outside the nucleus become important as 
derivatives of this foundational norm.85 
Examples of this approach are illustrative. The Human Rights Com-
mittee addresses preventive health care and nutrition policies through the 
lens of the foundational right to life.86 In a General Comment, the Human 
Rights Committee notes that the “inherent right to life” cannot be consi-
dered in a restrictive manner, but rather, the protection of this right re-
quires that State Parties take positive measures to decrease infant mor-
tality and increase life expectancy, especially in addressing malnutrition 
and disease epidemics.87 
Within foreign domestic courts’ socio-economic rights jurisprudence, 
the “essentialist” model has gained traction as well. India’s courts, for 
example, have defined the minimum core of socio-economic rights rela-
tive to a central norm—the minimum necessary for survival and basic 
needs. The Supreme Court of India has made no express reference to a 
minimum core, yet the Court regularly uses language referring to the es-
                                                                                                             
 82. Young, supra note 65, at 126–40. 
 83. See id. 
 84. See id. 
 85. See id. 
 86. See, e.g., Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6, Secretariat, Compila-
tion of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights 
Treaty Bodies, at 127, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 (2003). 
 87.  See id. “The Committee has noted that the right to life has been too narrowly 
interpreted. The expression ‘inherent right to life’ cannot properly be understood in a 
restrictive manner, and the protection of this right requires that States adopt positive 
measures. In this connection, the Committee considers that it would be desirable for 
States Parties to take all possible measures to reduce infant mortality and to increase life 
expectancy, especially in adopting measures to eliminate malnutrition and epidemics.” Id. 
¶ 5. 
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sential minimum of a right and that which is minimally required.88 In 
People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, for example, the 
Court sternly addressed starvation deaths that had taken place in India 
despite the State’s excess food stocks.89 It ordered all State governments 
and the Union of India to immediately enforce food schemes to the poor 
in order to ensure the right to food, a derivative of and requisite for the 
right to life.90 Indeed, the Court found that the right to food followed 
from the fundamental “right to life” enshrined in Article 21 of the Indian 
Constitution.91 In another case before the Supreme Court of India, the 
Court similarly explained the right to emergency health care as forming 
an integral part of the fundamental right to life.92 
More recently, the Constitutional Court of Columbia reviewed twenty-
two tutela actions brought in response to alleged violations of the consti-
tutional right to health.93 The tutela is a special constitutional writ intro-
duced in the Colombian Constitution of 1991.94 Through the writ, any 
citizen can directly request that a judge protect a fundamental right when 
the state violates the right and when no other legal action can effectively 
prevent the violation.95 The Colombia Constitutional Court reviews a 
small proportion of the voluminous tutela actions adjudicated by lower 
courts.96 Astoundingly, more than 300,000 tutela actions have been ad-
judicated by lower courts each year, with 36% of these related to the 
                                                                                                             
 88. See People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India & Ors., (1997) 1 S.C.C. 
301 (India). 
 89. Id.; see also People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, Writ Petition 
(Civil) No. 196 of 2001 (India) (Nov. 28, 2001, interim order) (establishing a constitu-
tional right to food). 
 90. See generally Young, supra note 65; see also People’s Union for Civil Liberties 
v. Union of India & Ors., Writ Petition (Civil) No.196 of 2001—Commentary, ESCR-
NET, http://www.escr-net.org/caselaw/caselaw_show.htm?doc_id=401033 (last visited 
Feb. 25, 2011); Chowdhury, supra note 81, at 9–10 (discussing Indian jurisprudence in 
this area). 
 91. See People’s Union, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 of 2001. 
 92. Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Anor., 
(1996) 4 S.C.C. 37 (India). 
 93. See Decision T-760 of 2008, ESCR-NET, http://www.escr-
net.org/caselaw/caselaw_show.htm?doc_id=985449 (last visited Feb. 25, 2011) [hereinaf-
ter Decision T-760 of 2008]; see also Alicia Yamin & Oscar Parra-Vera, How Do Courts 
Set Health Policy? The Case of the Colombian Constitutional Court, 6 PLOS MEDICINE 
147, 147  (2009), available at 
http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1000032
. 
 94. See Yamin & Parra-Vera, supra note 93. 
 95. See id. 
 96. See id. 
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right to health.97 In a broad and remarkable ruling in 2008, the Colombia 
Constitutional Court, after reviewing twenty-two tutela cases that were 
representative of various recurrent violations of rights, ordered remedies 
in all of the individual cases and ordered the government—including the 
Ministry of Social Protection and the health supervision and regulation 
agencies—to modify regulations and to expeditiously provide resources 
to bolster the health system.98 Significantly for the purposes of this Ar-
ticle, the Court identified the right to health as a fundamental right based 
on its nexus to the right to life.99 In making this analytical move, the 
Court embraced an essentialist theoretical approach to socio-economic 
rights, in which the right to health becomes fundamental based on its link 
to the intrinsic, undeniable right to life.100 
Other minimum core advocates within this theoretical approach argue 
for a more aspirational minimum core that goes beyond providing only 
what is required for basic needs, survival, and life. Some may more am-
bitiously look to the minimum core that is required for dignity or human 
flourishing.101 Such an approach appeals to the goals of the human rights 
movement, which did not intend to provide persons with only the bare 
minimum for survival, but rather affirmed “faith in fundamental human 
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person” and “determined to 
promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.”102 
Indeed, such an articulation—no doubt more robust than that defined 
under the survival/minimum needs approach—could help advance hu-
man rights more fully. Furthermore, a broader definition of the minimum 
core—drawn in relation to dignity and flourishing—may also allow for a 
more participatory approach, wherein persons can assist in articulating 
what it means to them to lead a dignified life. Of course, the criticism of 
such an essentialist approach—whether tied to narrower foundational 
norms such as the right to life or bolder norms such as the right to flou-
rish or to lead a life of dignity—is that by linking socio-economic rights 
                                                                                                             
 97. See id. (information is based on data provided by the Colombian Ombudsman’s 
Office for 2005). 
 98. See id. 
 99. See id. 
 100. See Young, supra note 65, at 126–40 (explaining the nature of such essentialist 
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 101. See, e.g., id. But see Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Inter-
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within the “core” to such foundational norms, one may actually narrow 
rather than enlarge the range of rights that are ultimately protected.103 In 
other words, rights that are intrinsically important, but that are not linked 
to the foundational norm, might exist on the periphery, outside of the 
protected core. And more broadly, such an approach is myopic for its 
failure to consider the critical way in which even normative rights are 
shaped by remedial considerations.104 
A second theoretical approach to the minimum core is one built upon a 
notion of consensus.105 This approach seeks to identify the consensus-
based content of a minimum core—i.e. the precise boundaries of a mu-
tually accepted minimum core. Advocates of this approach proceed to 
identify key elements of the core based upon a range of more or less de-
finite considerations, such as “wider agreement,” “extensive experience 
[and] . . . examin[ation],” and the “synthesis of . . . jurisprudence.”106 
They do so by invoking legal documents that codify specific obligations 
accompanying socio-economic rights, such as human rights treaties and 
the jurisprudence that has evolved thereunder.107 They look to the con-
cluding observations and comments that treaty body committees issue to 
State Parties during periodic reporting sessions in order to further under-
stand the scope of the commonly-recognized “core.”108 
                                                                                                             
 103. See Young, supra note 65, at 127. 
 104. See infra notes 219–74 and accompanying text. 
 105. See Young, supra note 65, at 140–51. 
 106. See id. Young cites the following sources as exemplars of these approaches, re-
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The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 473, 491 (Philip Alston ed., 1992). 
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This approach also considers the work of ratifying states that have im-
plemented domestic legal measures to protect social and economic rights 
in accordance with their international commitments.109 For example, a 
state may ratify the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights, and subsequently adopt domestic legislation requiring itself 
to provide health care on a non-discriminatory basis, in accordance with 
Article 2 and General Comment 3 of the Covenant.110 That the substan-
tive content of non-discrimination is seen through a multitude of State 
Parties that ratified the Convention—as well as various parties’ enact-
ment of domestic non-discrimination laws in accordance with the Con-
vention—supports the argument that the nucleus of consensus includes 
the principle of non-discrimination. 
Consensus as to the minimum core may ultimately be impacted by no-
tions of constitutional borrowing, as articulated by Frank Michelman, 
wherein one country’s constitutional and legal industry might effectively 
“export” influence to other countries, which as a consequence adopt this 
approach.111 Theories of borrowing and transplantation of law permeate 
many academic theorists’ approaches to comparative constitutional 
law.112 No doubt, these approaches—to the extent that they are brought 
to bear—could contribute to the formulation of an ultimate “consensus” 
approach, albeit with its own share of potential weaknesses. 
For example, some commentators criticize the consensus approach for 
leading to conservative and abstract conceptions of rights, as polarized 
conceptions of socio-economic rights lead nations to only mutually agree 
upon a narrow “core.”113 Constitutional borrowing may exacerbate these 
problems. Others refer to this as the “lowest common denominator” im-
plication of the consensus approach, whereby the minimum core is mu-
tually defined as the lowest level of rights protections to which states can 
agree.114 Indeed, borrowing from another familiar setting in international 
law, “[a]s a long-standing criticism of the treaty system makes clear, the 
requirement for consensus across different legal systems will impede a 
norm’s progress and development.”115 The result of this least common 
                                                                                                             
 109. See id. 
 110. General Comment No. 3, supra note 74. 
 111. See Frank I. Michelman, Borrowing: Reflection, 82 TEX. L. REV 1737, 1737 
(2004). 
 112. Id. at 1758 (noting that “the discourses on borrowing and transplantation . . . have 
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 113. See, e.g., Young, supra note 65, at 148. 
 114. See id. at 147. 
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denominator implication is a bias toward maintaining the status quo and 
understanding rights in uncontroversial ways. This bias stands in direct 
tension with the goals of “progressive realization” embodied in most ar-
ticulations of socio-economic rights. Further, the notion of true consen-
sus itself leads to the paradoxical outcome that if a marginal few refuse 
to consent to a particular conception, then their voices ultimately de-
fine—and narrow—the consensus articulation of the minimum core. 
Thus, when adhering to a consensus understanding, the quixotic, poten-
tially transformative conceptions of socio-economic rights evaporate 
from the minimum core in the absence of universal consensus. 
In practice, this second consensus-based approach has similarities to 
the first, “essential minimum” approach. Both approaches aspire to iden-
tify a “core of certainty and a penumbra of doubt.”116 It is foreseeable 
that both approaches could yield overlapping results, as the United Na-
tions Millennium Development Goals, the World Health Organization, 
and other international standards and standard-setting agencies define the 
essential minimum of a right with respect to a foundational principle 
(such as the minimum health care needed for living or flourishing) and 
with an eye toward consensus-based understandings of social and eco-
nomic rights. Yet, in the process of delineating this common nucleus 
upon which “all” can agree,117 questions of large import emerge: does the 
debate regarding the appropriate methodology of defining rights detract 
from the arguably more important questions regarding what the content 
should be? Which voices comprise the consensus-forming nucleus, and 
are marginalized voices included and provided a platform? Is the notion 
of a resolute core of rights necessarily a “shifting concept”?118 And, criti-
                                                                                                             
 116. See id. at 141 (citing H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 123 (2d ed. 1994)). 
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realities of geopolitics. See M.R. HAFEZNIA, PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS OF GEOPOLITICS 
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 118. See, e.g., EXPLORING THE CORE CONTENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS: 
SOUTH AFRICAN AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (2002). One might query whether, 
normatively, there are advantages, in fact, to having a “shifting” conception of the mini-
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cal to the analysis here, what role do remedies play in shaping this com-
mon nucleus under consensus-based or essentialist approaches? 
Young points to a third theoretical approach to defining the content of 
socio-economic rights that looks at the “minimum obligation” of states 
under a minimum core approach. As she astutely recognizes, this third 
conception, growing in popularity, relies upon and integrates the founda-
tional justifications seen in the previous two approaches.119 For better or 
worse, the reference to “minimum obligations” could be understood as 
an attempt to evade the challenging questions regarding how theorists 
define and justify the core content of socio-economic rights. Under this 
approach, states are obligated to act, rather than to merely think and 
question.120 To this end, the Committee has articulated “core obligations” 
that State Parties must assume in order to fulfill their commitments under 
the Covenant and has thereby demarcated what will be clear violations of 
the Covenant.121 Thus, a benefit of this third conception of core obliga-
tions is that it tackles the challenge of adjudicating socio-economic rights 
violations. The minimum core obligations become the minimum area of 
social and economic rights that are protected and enforceable through the 
judicial system.122 Yet the third theoretical approach to defining social 
and economic rights also falls prey to similar challenges as in the first 
two outlined approaches, as explained below. 
3. Criticisms of the Minimum Core 
One of the central weaknesses of the minimum core conception is 
based in the entire operation of articulating a baseline “minimum”—of 
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 119. See Young, supra note 65, at 151. 
 120. See id. 
 121. See General Comment No. 3, supra note 74 (“In order for a State Party to be able 
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articulating the minimum core . . . .”). 
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unraveling complex bundles of rights into their discrete parts in a Hoh-
feldian operation.123 Such an operation is antithetical to the very nature 
of socio-economic rights, which are interrelated and suffer concomitant 
violations, and as explained in the later parts of this Article, are ultimate-
ly defined in correspondence with remedies. 
Therefore, one must question whether the entire endeavor to define the 
minimum core of certain socio-economic rights narrows, rather than en-
larges, the range of socio-economic rights. For example, in the essential 
minimum approach, by connecting rights’ definitions to a grounded no-
tion such as the right to life, does one undermine the broader human 
rights goal of achieving social and economic progress for all persons?124 
One might also question whether this endeavor to define a “minimum 
core” of rights is rooted in a false sense of determinacy, particularly as 
applied to relatively broad, subjective rights. Is there truly a determinate 
content to a foundational norm such as “dignity” or “flourishing” under 
an “essence” approach? Is it any easier to identify the resolute content of 
the right to health in any meaningful way through a consensus-based ap-
proach?125 Does pointing to states’ minimum obligations to meet such a 
right to health obviate the need to finally define the precise content? 
In short, each of these approaches to the minimum core endeavors to 
create an objective definition of a complicated socio-economic right that 
includes largely context-dependent minimum requirements. As Amartya 
                                                                                                             
 123. See Lawrence C. Becker, The Moral Basis of Property Rights, in PROPERTY 187, 
190 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980) (describing Wesley Newcomb 
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 124. See Young, supra note 65, at 127. 
 125. For example, query whether the right to health would require emergency obstetric 
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and flourishing, as deprivations of such emergency care lead to maternal mortality. See 
Margaux J. Hall, Using International Law to Promote Millennium Health Targets: A Role 
for the CEDAW Optional Protocol in Reducing Maternal Mortality, 28 WIS. INT’L. L.J. 
74, 75 (2010) (highlighting the interconnection between women’s deprivation of their 
right to health through emergency obstetric care and their deprivation of their right to life, 
and offering a potential remedy to such deprivations through the Convention on the Eli-
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might fall short of consensus, and of becoming a minimum obligation for states, under 
those theoretical approaches to the minimum core. 
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Sen notes, line-drawing leads to inherent, inevitable arbitrariness that 
extends beyond natural variety found in regions or groups of persons.126 
Sen’s concerns are not just theoretical; the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa has struggled with the tensions in such line drawing around rights 
guaranteed in the constitution,127 as have many other constitutional 
courts adjudicating socio-economic rights. 
B. Alternatives to the “Minimum Core”—Assessing the Reasonableness 
of Government Action 
In practice, efforts to define the core of particular socio-economic 
rights have been strained and generally unsuccessful, if not outright re-
jected. The Constitutional Court of South Africa, for example, has been 
deliberate in articulating the contours of various socio-economic rights 
that are broadly provided in the country’s bold constitution; yet the 
forced efforts to define the contents of particular socio-economic rights 
have been particularly evident in the progeny of cases the Court has ad-
judicated.128 
As alluded to earlier, the Court’s approach was recently evident in Ma-
zibuko and Others v. City of Johannesburg, in which applicants asked the 
Court to define the minimum content of the right to water under the Con-
stitution of South Africa.129 The Mazibuko applicants asked the Court to 
define the minimum amount of water required to live a life of dignity, 
rather than a “mere minimum content” to the right to water.130 The Court 
explained that the applicants made “in effect, an argument similar to a 
minimum core argument though it is more extensive because it goes 
beyond the minimum. The applicants’ argument is that the proposed 
amount (50 litres per person per day) is what is necessary for dignified 
human life.”131 The Court pointed out that the requested “minimum” was 
actually more than a baseline minimum: “[the applicants] expressly re-
ject the notion that it is the minimum core protection required by the 
                                                                                                             
 126. See AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES: AN ESSAY ON ENTITLEMENT AND 
DEPRIVATION 12 (1982) (emphasizing that even the requirements for human survival are 
not clear-cut; they have an “inherent arbitrariness that goes well beyond . . . groups and 
regions”). 
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 128. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 127. 
 129. See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text. 
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right.”132 The Court responded to the applicants’ “minimum-plus” re-
quest by firmly rejecting the notion of a “minimum core” in South Afri-
ca’s Constitution.133 
In this recent rejection of the notion of a “minimum core,” the Mazibu-
ko Court emphasized that certain rights—although guaranteed in the 
Constitution—will not be realized immediately and instead must be sub-
ject to “progressive realization.”134 The Mazibuko Court found that the 
Constitution of South Africa “requires the state to take reasonable legis-
lative and other measures progressively to achieve the right of access to 
sufficient water within available resources. It does not confer a right to 
claim sufficient water from the state immediately.”135 This reasonable-
ness analysis enabled the Court to adjudicate the fact-specific and case-
specific circumstances surrounding the government’s alleged failure to 
fulfill rights guaranteed in the Constitution. 
The Court described the history of South Africa’s enactment of its 
Constitution, set against the backdrop of massive deprivations in a newly 
post-apartheid country.136 Presuming the drafters did not expect that the 
state would be able to “furnish citizens immediately with all the basic 
necessities of life,”137 the Court explained, “[t]he fact that the state must 
take steps progressively to realise the right implicitly recognises that the 
right of access to sufficient water cannot be achieved immediately.”138 In 
essence, the Court identified the right available in the immediate term as 
one tempered by the practical realities of a newly post-apartheid South 
Africa, a right that was ultimately subordinated to (and less than) the 
pure ideal of the right. 
The important consideration for the Court was whether the new gov-
ernment was taking its responsibilities seriously—“to ensure that the 
state continues to take reasonable legislative and other measures progres-
sively to achieve the realisation of the rights to the basic necessities of 
life.”139 The Mazibuko Court, as in previous cases such as Grootboom 
and Treatment Action Campaign, looked to whether the government’s 
conduct was “reasonable.”140 
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The Court’s pronouncement was to the surprise and dismay of many 
human rights advocates—and minimum core advocates—who saw Ma-
zibuko as a significant setback in their efforts to delineate and realize 
socio-economic rights. Many advocates have found that the “reasonable” 
analysis provides an almost impermeable shield through which govern-
ment’s shortfalls are recast as successes and progress in the right direc-
tion.141 Yet, paradoxically, the South African approach to socio-
economic rights, framed in a “reasonable” analysis, has remained one of 
the most successful approaches in defining a more determinate content to 
socio-economic rights. 
Notably, tensions abound on both the “minimum core” and “reasona-
bleness” ends of the human rights realization endeavor. The “reasonable-
ness” approach undoubtedly provides wide latitude for government to 
delay and sequence implementation of policy programs with broad dis-
cretion. Yet, the Mazibuko applicants’ desire to obtain a prescription for 
the “minimum core” of the right to water to enable a person to live a 
“dignified human life” was surely riddled with tensions as well.142 It is 
difficult for a court to quantify what constitutes a dignified human life in 
a purely metric sense, measured by gallons per day.143 Further, what 
would be the cost to a court’s own legitimacy if it were to require the 
state to provide beyond its pragmatic means or political will? The Con-
stitutional Court discerningly described limitations on its power to adju-
dicate such issues in a constitutional democracy: 
[O]rdinarily it is institutionally inappropriate for a court to determine 
precisely what the achievement of any particular social and economic 
right entails and what steps government should take to ensure the pro-
gressive realisation of the right. This is a matter, in the first place, for 
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realization? 
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the legislature and executive, the institutions of government best placed 
to investigate social conditions in the light of available budgets and to 
determine what targets are achievable in relation to social and econom-
ic rights. Indeed, it is desirable as a matter of democratic accountability 
that they should do so for it is their programmes and promises that are 
subjected to democratic popular choice.144 
The Court went on to articulate that judges are ill placed to make deter-
minations of what constitutes “sufficient water” for both institutional and 
democratic reasons.145 It in turn emphasized its regard for the other 
branches of government in their policy-making decisions.146 
The meaning of these statements and their implications are revisited 
below,147 but first the role of remedies in socio-economic rights jurispru-
dence must be examined. The following Sections’ analysis seeks to dem-
onstrate the strong influence of remedies on socio-economic rights in 
cases like Mazibuko. In other words, despite the fact that no remedy was 
awarded to the Mazibuko applicants, remedial considerations, including 
those concerning institutional capacity and democratic accountability, 
influenced the very nature of the right itself, perhaps in ways more im-
portant than if the content of the right was indeed conceived in a vacuum. 
III. THEORIES OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC REMEDIES 
Scholars and advocates criticize courts that recognize socio-economic 
rights while limiting the meaning of the promises contained therein.148 
This Section probes the criticized rights-remedies divide to understand 
and question its normative basis, thus canvassing various characteriza-
tions of socio-economic rights interpretation—including the role of the 
judiciary in reviewing the implementation of constitutional rights in a 
strong- or weak-form manner. Strong-form review and weak-form re-
view are ways of structuring judicial review of legislative action.149 Un-
der strong-form review, courts have the general authority to interpret the 
constitution and the rights therein.150 Under weak-form review, courts 
can evaluate legislation to determine its constitutionality; however, the 
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legislature has room to reenact—and ultimately displace—judicial inter-
pretations of the constitution, thereby depriving courts of having the ul-
timate “say” on the definition of rights.151 In identifying these dual types 
of scrutiny of legislative action, it is clear that neither method seeks con-
sonance between socio-economic rights and remedies. Rather, both seek 
to analyze and characterize the dissonance in this space, largely by defin-
ing which institutions retain more power to define rights and their limita-
tions. Although strong-form structure of review comes closer to harmo-
nizing or equilibrating rights and remedies, it nonetheless falls short be-
cause of practical constraints that make an idealistic right unattainable 
and because it proceeds down a restrictive one-way street in which rights 
are taken as established entities, from which remedies ultimately flow. 
This Article offers an alternative conception of rights and remedies. In 
order to lay the groundwork to do so, this Section highlights theories sur-
rounding the purpose of remedies. It then assesses the traditional “rights 
essentialist” characterization of remedies that accepts and expects dis-
cord between pure rights and tainted remedies. An alternative conception 
is proposed that seeks to “equilibrate”152 rights and remedies by recog-
nizing that rights are defined in accordance with desired and expected 
remedial outcomes. Relying on remedial equilibration in U.S. constitu-
tional law, formative socio-economic rights opinions are considered 
through this new lens, noting the importance of transparency in regards 
to remedial deterrence. Not all areas of the law have such a disconnect 
between rights and remedies, and the Article briefly provides a few ex-
amples of other areas in private law where such a disconnect is not evi-
dent, focusing on distinctions between socio-economic rights jurispru-
dence and areas of private law like contract and property. 
One of the best settings in which to explore the remedial landscape in 
socio-economic rights jurisprudence is, again, through the cases from the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa. Just as the Constitutional Court has 
been one of the courts to most successfully define a resolute content to 
socio-economic rights, it has also fostered an innovative form of enforc-
ing these rights. Commentators widely debate the approach the Constitu-
tional Court has taken, with some viewing it as a weak-form review of 
rights enforcement and others as a strong-form review of rights enforce-
ment. 
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2011] HUMAN RIGHTS AND REMEDIAL EQUILIBRATION 485 
A. Weak-Form Review 
Mark Tushnet characterizes the Constitutional Court of South Africa’s 
socio-economic rights enforcement as a “weak form” review that allo-
cates significant discretion to the legislature to enforce socio-economic 
rights based on the significant budgetary implications of such enforce-
ment decisions.153 In such weak-form judicial review, courts may defer 
to the actions of the executive or legislative branches, assuming that 
these branches’ policy determinations are the most effective mechanism 
for enforcing rights.154 
Even more pragmatically, Cass Sunstein emphasizes that the enforce-
ment of constitutional rights is a costly endeavor, as all constitutional 
rights have budgetary implications.155 Sunstein’s argument resonates 
with the decision in Khosa v. Minister of Social Development, in which 
the state failed to provide reasonable budgetary or financial reasons why 
it could not extend social and economic services to residents.156 In the 
absence of a reasonable cost-motivated explanation, the Court ruled, the 
government’s exclusion was unreasonable.157 
Sunstein implicitly accepts a rights-remedies divide, arguing that in en-
forcing rights, courts focus their attention on the reasonableness of go-
vernmental behavior.158 Sunstein thus likens constitutional rights adjudi-
cation in South Africa to administrative law approaches, which evaluate 
policies of other branches of government in order to determine whether 
those policies are reasonable.159 Insofar as all constitutional rights de-
pend upon state expenditures for their protection, the decision to involve 
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and delegate decision-making authority to an accountable, elected legis-
lature is a tacit acceptance of weak-form review. 
Weak-form review allows for more flexible remedial rules that eva-
luate contextual elements, accepting less than complete remedies in light 
of other social goals.160 Under Paul Gewirtz’s dual characterization of 
remedial approaches, weak-form review most closely aligns with the 
conception of “Interest Balancing,” wherein the effectiveness of a reme-
dy for a particular victim is just one consideration in selecting a remedy 
(albeit a critical one, particularly in the context of civil and political 
rights).161 Put another way, following Gewirtz’s understanding, courts 
consider and temper their remedial programs by considering other so-
cietal interests, including those of individuals outside the immediate liti-
gation.162 
Evidence for the Constitutional Court of South Africa employing 
weak-form review in its analysis of legislative action (or inaction) is 
plentiful. In Treatment Action Campaign, the Court emphasized that the 
Constitution granted the Court broad remedial authority, including the 
power to grant supervisory injunctions.163 While clarifying the existence 
of these broad remedial powers, the Court declined to exercise them, re-
jecting the lower Court’s decision to grant a bold injunction, and noting 
instead that “[t]he government has always respected and executed [the] 
orders of this Court. There is no reason to believe that it will not do so in 
the present case.”164 Similarly, the recent Mazibuko decision affirms 
weak-form characterizations of the Constitutional Court’s review given 
the Court’s reluctance to enforce a resolute right of access to water under 
the Constitution beyond what the government had provided.165 
The weak-form approach has not been without its detractors. Many in 
South Africa criticize the Constitutional Court’s deferential approach, 
viewing the Court as adopting an overly narrow view of its role and the-
reby failing to provide real meaning to the rights guaranteed in the Con-
stitution.166 Some commentators attack the “reasonableness” model, ar-
guing that the Constitutional Court’s approach has allowed government 
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intransigence and has deprived rights of any tangible meaning.167 Other 
scholars point out that all that is left is the mere promise of “reasonable” 
government action, without even any priority setting.168 
Indeed, the Mazibuko Court considered the broader interests of all per-
sons in South Africa when it decided that the government had reasonably 
provided for the constitutional right of access to water for the appli-
cants.169 The Court balanced costs to parties outside the specific piece of 
litigation before it. In its introductory remarks it stated that “[t]he case 
needs to be understood in the context of the challenges facing Johannes-
burg as a City,” a City that it noted has 3.2 million people residing in one 
million households.170 The Court continued, “It can be seen that there is 
much to be done to ‘[i]mprove the quality of life of all citizens,’ an im-
portant goal set by the preamble of our Constitution.”171 Mazibuko there-
by framed its legal analysis in light of broader pragmatic and policy-
based considerations of the welfare of the numerous residents of the City 
of Johannesburg, many of whom continually suffer from resource depri-
vations.172 
A range of other pragmatic and institutional considerations, beyond 
those expressly articulated in the opinion, may have affected the Mazibu-
ko Court’s analysis. Commentators have engaged in a robust debate as to 
how strong the Court’s enforcement could have actually been without 
undermining its own legitimacy and competency.173 Of course, it is im-
portant to note that simply characterizing the Court’s review as having a 
weak-form structure provides only a narrow insight into its ruling. In 
considering remedial alternatives, the Court ultimately defined the prac-
tical scope of the right to water as well. 
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Such an “interest balancing” approach does not aim to harmonize 
rights and remedies. It proceeds by taking the essence of a constitutional 
right as a given, which is then tempered by practical considerations. In 
this manner, “interest balancing” provides only a shallow interpretation 
of the nuanced interplay between rights and remedies. This approach 
oversimplifies; it focuses entirely on the remedial program that follows 
from the existence of a particular, pure right, without considering how 
remedies alter that very right. 
Some scholars assuage this oversimplification. Rosalind Dixon, for ex-
ample, explores the territory of the rights-remedies divide and proposes a 
solution of “constitutional dialogue,” which “favors a weaker approach, 
requiring courts to adopt either weak rights or weak remedies, depending 
on the circumstances of the particular country and case.”174 Dixon’s “di-
alogue” approach has the advantage of looking at both rights and reme-
dies, and of seemingly rejecting the strict line of causation wherein rights 
are defined in order to achieve ends, and remedies then submit to prac-
tical economic, social, and political constraints. Yet, ultimately, Dixon’s 
approach also fails to achieve consonance in this arena because it cannot 
provide a detailed account of how remedies actually inform the content 
of rights. Indeed, little analysis to date has tried to reexamine the un-
iverse of socio-economic rights jurisprudence to focus a lens on the rela-
tionship between rights and remedies and how remedial considerations 
ultimately shape the nature of the right.175 
B. Strong-Form Review 
Under a strong-form structure of review, a court’s constitutional inter-
pretations are authoritative and binding on other governmental branches, 
at least in the short- and medium-term.176 Courts may order that the gov-
ernment enact specific changes to a program or policy, or at times issue a 
structural injunction to ensure compliance with their constitutional inter-
pretation.177 An example of this stronger-form of review can be seen in 
the Constitutional Court of South Africa’s cases Treatment Action Cam-
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paign178 and Khosa.179 In Treatment Action Campaign, the Court found 
that the state had breached its obligations under Section 27 of the Consti-
tution regarding the right to health care by restricting provision of the 
nevirapine drug when it had the resources to provide it more broadly.180 
The Court ordered the government to take specific action to make the 
drug more available.181 
In Khosa, the Court rejected as unreasonable the government’s argu-
ment that excluding permanent South African residents from the socio-
economic assistance that the country provides to citizens was justified for 
financial reasons under Section 27(2) of the Constitution.182 The gov-
ernment failed to supply the Court with data regarding the number of 
permanent residents that would qualify for social assistance should the 
citizenship restriction be lifted, or the attendant costs that would go along 
with such a change.183 In the absence of such data, the Court inserted its 
own estimated cost analysis to determine that any increase in cost to the 
government for the inclusion of permanent residents in social assistance 
programs was negligible, at less than 2% of total expenditures.184 One 
academic notes the following: 
[W]hen there is strong evidence the government has failed—either de-
liberately, as in TAC [Treatment Action Campaign], or through serious 
incompetence, as in Khosa—to make policy choices through a rational 
and deliberate process, the Court will take a much more direct role and 
give much less deference to the justifications put forth by the govern-
ment in support of its chosen policy.185 
Many minimum core advocates are also proponents of strong-form re-
view, through which courts take a more direct and affirmative role in 
enforcing socio-economic rights. Under the strongest-form of review, 
judges could engage in purist “rights maximizing” exercises, in which 
the only question the court would ask once finding a rights violation is 
what remedy would most effectively vindicate the victim, with effective-
ness being defined as the successful elimination of the adverse conse-
                                                                                                             
 178. See generally Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 
(CC) (S. Afr.). 
 179. See generally Khosa v. Minister of Social Development 2004 (11) BCLR 1169 
(CC) (S. Afr.). 
 180. See generally Minister of Health, 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC). 
 181. See generally id. 
 182. See generally Khosa, 2004 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC). 
 183. See id. para. 61. 
 184. See id. paras. 62, 81–82. 
 185. See Ray, supra note 148, at 166–67. 
490 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 36:2 
quences of the rights violation.186 The remedial enterprise under such 
review is limited to considerations of the right at stake and the requisite 
steps to make the victim whole again. Stated simply, under the “rights 
maximizing” model, a remedial program stops when nothing more is 
feasible.187 A court is limited by the very definition of a right; a court 
cannot order a remedy beyond the scope of the right to which the indi-
vidual was entitled.188 
A range of academic literature highlights the limits of strong-form re-
view.189 The strongest form of review can forsake other competing inter-
ests, interpretations, and values, including the needs of those persons not 
party to the litigation at hand but who will be affected by the outcome.190 
Strong-form review also risks exceeding institutional constraints, particu-
larly in environments with limited resources. In recent years, Professor 
Brian Ray has embraced a tempered notion of strong-form review—what 
he describes as a “polycentric” review of rights.191 Under Ray’s polycen-
tric form of review, a court shares interpretive authority with the execu-
tive and legislative branches; the court considers those branches’ consti-
tutional interpretations even when they differ from the court’s own.192 
The strong-form of review comes closest to achieving consonance be-
tween rights and remedies. It is more, but not wholly, successful in this 
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endeavor as compared with weak-form review. But strong-form review 
ultimately fails because it proceeds by first finding a violation of a right 
and then seeking direct enforcement of a remedy, and, as this Article ar-
gues, under such an approach rights and remedies lack harmony. Strong-
form review conceptualizes a one-way street of causation, in which 
rights affect remedies, and not the reverse. Under such a view, remedies 
are connected to rights in so far as they are a product of the rights. The 
strong-form analysis is thus limited to making remedies align with estab-
lished rights. Further, strong-form review has limited success because it 
confronts the practical realities of a resistant, multidimensional world 
that prevents the institution of a perfect remedy.193 Thus, the strong-form 
academic analysis of socio-economic rights jurisprudence ultimately fails 
to astutely describe the full relationship between rights and remedies; it 
does not evaluate how courts redefine rights as they contemplate and in-
stitute remedies. 
IV. RIGHTS-REMEDIES EQUILIBRATION 
A. Rights-Remedies Harmonization in Other Areas of Law 
Seeking to re-conceptualize the relationship between rights and reme-
dies is a useful and not unfamiliar endeavor. Other areas of law have 
long considered rights and remedies as functionally inseparable.194 For 
example, contract law anticipates notions of an efficient breach in which, 
despite a party’s clearly established obligations under a contract, it may 
breach the contract because the costs of performance outweigh the costs 
of damages for breach.195 Oliver Wendell Holmes instructs that “[t]he 
duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must 
pay damages if you do not keep it,—and nothing else.”196 He elaborates, 
“[A] legal duty so called is nothing but a prediction that if a man does or 
omits certain things he will be made to suffer in this or that way [i.e. via 
a remedy] by judgment of the court;—and so of a legal right.”197 Another 
illustration is in Coase-ian theory, which academics, practitioners, and 
courts have applied to a wide spectrum of areas in private law including 
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torts, property, and environmental law.198 Under this theory, the individ-
ual with the right is oftentimes not as important as how the law can best 
protect the right to facilitate efficient transfers.199 Coase predicts that in-
dividuals may trade and sell rights in the marketplace, with the market 
reaching the efficient result (with the assistance of properly calibrated 
legal rules).200 This well-established notion in private law regarding an-
ticipated breaches of a right—or trading ownership of a right—is entirely 
foreign to socio-economic rights jurisprudence. 
Certainly, there are important distinctions between these private law 
examples and those under constitutional law, which protect sacred rights 
such as the right to due process of law or—in the case of human rights—
the rights to health, water, or more essentially, life. The optimum level of 
breach for some of these rights may be zero or quite close to zero.201 
Trading ownership of these rights to facilitate efficient transfers is likely 
both infeasible and offensive. Nevertheless, these private law examples 
provide a helpful doctrinal lens through which to view the disconnect 
between rights and remedies in socio-economic rights jurisprudence. But 
before putting into action what Levinson proposes—an “equilibration” of 
rights and remedies, as he describes it in the domestic context—it is im-
portant to explore the fundamental premises underlying rights and reme-
dies. 
B. Theories of the Function of Remedies 
In his formative examination into remedial resistance in American 
constitutional law and the Brown v. Board of Education202 desegregation 
remedies, Gewirtz emphasizes that “[t]he function of a remedy is to 
‘realize’ a legal norm, to make it a ‘living truth.’”203 Gewirtz likens re-
medies to “the hard stuff of recalcitrant reality” that, although as impor-
tant to jurisprudence as idealized rights, are relegated to a far less gla-
morous existence.204 As Daryl Levinson artfully describes, in much of 
constitutional discourse “[r]ights occupy an exalted sphere of principle, 
while remedies are consigned to the banausic sphere of policy, pragmat-
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ism, and politics.”205 Under the “rights essentialist” model discussed ear-
lier,206 remedies are affected by rights. Causation runs from rights to re-
medies because rights are defined instrumentally to achieve their end 
goals.207 Remedies also temper rights aspirations—and one might validly 
worry that rights will be corrupted by the practical realities of reme-
dies.208 Rights essentialist proponents leave room for such a conse-
quence. In fact, they predict that pure rights will be corrupted by exactly 
this remedial exercise.209 The interest in individual redress must at times 
yield to other factors.210 
Ronald Dworkin is perhaps most closely associated with the essential-
ist view of constitutional rights, having distinguished arguments of prin-
cipal that establish an individual right from arguments of policy that in-
tend to establish a collective goal.211 In Dworkin’s conception, policy 
arguments consider the welfare of political goals of a broader communi-
ty; they can account for practical or empirical concerns.212 For example, 
in Brown,213 the policy argument could consider the risks of racial back-
lash and potential unenforceability of a remedial program.214 In more 
recent U.S. constitutional cases regarding health care provision to pris-
oners, the policy argument can consider the costs of improving health 
care for prisoners, as well as the competing societal welfare goal of de-
voting limited resources to other underserved populations.215 
Arguments of principle, in contrast to policy-based arguments, affirm 
the primacy of individual rights, and these arguments, in Dworkin’s 
view, “trump” pragmatic policy considerations.216 In turn, under prin-
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ciple-based arguments, elected officials have primary authority to effect 
policy decisions because they have the institutional ability to most effec-
tively consider competing interests within the community and balance 
these interests.217 On the other hand, judges have primary authority to 
effect principle-based decisions because they are best situated to theorize 
about moral ends and have the advantage of being somewhat insulated 
from political pressures.218 
C. An Alternative View—Rights Equilibration 
Rights essentialism, while well-situated historically in academic analy-
sis, is not the only way in which to approach rights-remedies analysis. 
Other scholars embrace a more tempered approach to rights essentialism, 
viewing remedial imperfection as unavoidable but rejecting the stark line 
of “[p]ure rights, dirty remedies.”219 Gewirtz finds 
a permeable wall between rights and remedies: The prospect of actual-
izing rights through a remedy—the recognition that rights are for actual 
people in an actual world—makes it inevitable that thoughts of remedy 
will affect thoughts of right, that judges’ minds will shuttle back and 
forth between right and remedy.220 
Gewirtz, therefore, focuses a lens on remedies for racial segregation in 
public schools in the United States: with the Court’s famous and para-
doxical ordering of “all deliberate speed” to desegregate schools, the Su-
preme Court allowed remedial imperfection, in response to what many 
viewed as the risk of white racial backlash.221 
Levinson, like Gewirtz, points out that under an alternative “rights 
equilibration” theory, rights are not first discerned as noble principles; 
rather, they are “inevitably shaped by, and incorporate, remedial con-
cerns.”222 Remedies cannot be sharply separated from rights, and rights 
interpretation is stymied, or bolstered, by the imposition of remedies. 
In the context of constitutional rights, Levinson articulates three ways 
in which rights are influenced by and interconnected with remedies.223 
The following Section proceeds by explaining these three forms of 
rights-remedies relations and demonstrating how each is present in socio-
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economic rights jurisprudence. The Section then sets the stage for Part V, 
which discusses the implications of, and potential constraints surround-
ing, such a new and harmonious view of rights and remedies. 
1. Remedial Deterrence 
First, under the doctrine of “remedial deterrence,” rights can be af-
fected by the nature of the remedy that would be required if the right 
were to be violated. In the classic example of Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, a de facto interpretation of the right to equal education would re-
quire courts to maintain race-conscious desegregation systems, potential-
ly including busing programs and other supervisory programs, in order to 
ensure that schools maintained racial proportionality.224 Gewirtz points 
to white racial groups’ resistance to a de facto remedy as an influencing 
factor in the Court’s limitation of the right to equal education. “[T]he 
Court made clear that this transition [to a public education system free 
from racial discrimination] would not have to be immediate. Brown II 
approved an imperfect remedy—delayed desegregation—and did so be-
cause of feared white resistance.”225 The Court’s resulting instruction to 
district courts to “enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opi-
nion as are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially 
nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these cas-
es”226 was characterized by ambiguity. The words “deliberate” and 
“speed” reflected distinct and differing courses of action, and the use of 
the word “all” further intensified the ambiguity.227 The confounding or-
der of “all deliberate speed” imposed delay and resulted not only in ef-
fective remedial relief being postponed for some persons in the plaintiffs’ 
class; it also meant that certain members of the plaintiffs’ class would 
never receive effective remedial relief because the remedy would be in-
stituted after they had endured full and direct harm by being required to 
attend segregated schools.228 
Brown II was, therefore, a classic example of remedial deterrence, an 
exercise which has many modern-day forms as well. Courts may engage 
in remedial deterrence based upon considerations of institutional con-
straints and public perceptions. Courts frequently perceive undesirable 
remedial consequences and, in turn, construct the associated right in such 
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a way as to avoid achieving those undesired consequences.229 Gewirtz 
powerfully argues that a court may consider in its remedial deliberations 
a wide range of interests, except for those interests that are opposed to 
the nature of the very right.230 In the context of school desegregation, 
courts should not, then, consider white resistance to equal education in 
their deliberations because this involves an objection to the very nature 
of the right.231 This limitation remains a prudent guide-post, and as dis-
cussed below, can serve as an important constraint on remedial delibera-
tion in the context of socio-economic rights.232 
More recent domestic examples of remedial deterrence are plentiful, 
perhaps none more prominent and timely than challenges to the condi-
tions of confinement in California’s prison system consolidated in Cole-
man v. Schwarzenegger.233 In a series of orders over a number of years, 
the Coleman court issued only incremental relief in the face of continued 
constitutional violations.234 Only after the constitutional violations per-
sisted for fifteen years—and after having placed the entire California 
prison system in federal receivership—did the court finally issue a pris-
oner relief order, having clearly been deterred from ordering more dra-
matic action due to the state’s budgetary constraints and the difficulty of 
solving problems related to conditions in American prisons.235 The court 
appeared to recognize the heavy-handed nature of its order. However, the 
court noted that it had considered ordering prison construction, expan-
sion of medical facilities, and additional hiring, among other remedies, 
but that, quite simply, the litigation’s history “demonstrates even more 
starkly the impossibility of establishing a constitutionally adequate men-
tal health care delivery system at current levels of crowding.”236 
Moving from domestic examples, remedial deterrence is also prevalent 
in socio-economic rights jurisprudence. Constitutional cases adjudicating 
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socio-economic rights perspicuously balance a variety of interests—at 
the societal, economical, political, and institutional levels. The complexi-
ties of remedial deliberation undermine arguments that a complete re-
medial program, making the victim whole, is theoretically and pragmati-
cally possible.237 Complete remedies may be unavailable because of mul-
tiple and competing interests that the court must necessarily weigh in 
deciding upon and instituting a remedy. Complete remedies may also be 
unavailable because of pragmatic limitations on remedies.238 
Oftentimes, multiple remedial goals exist that thwart endeavors to im-
plement an idealized remedy. Particularly when rights violations have 
continued over a prolonged time, there may be more than one remedial 
goal.239 The attainment of one legally relevant remedial goal may obfus-
cate—or prevent—the attainment of another. For example, in providing 
for the right to education, one goal may be non-discrimination, as embo-
died under international covenants and national constitutions,240 while 
another may be redressing harms to children resulting from a history of 
status-based de facto or de jure disadvantage. More broadly, in socio-
economic rights jurisprudence, there are often a range of remedial goals, 
such as vindicating the rights of the particular petitioner and promoting 
society-wide equality and non-discrimination, including by assuaging 
historical biases.241 In the case of developing countries in particular, re-
levant remedial goals often include economic development, building the 
capacity of multiple branches of government, and reinforcing institution-
al competence and accountability.242 
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Remedial deterrence is uniquely useful in socio-economic rights juri-
sprudence, helping to explain the lack of a clear bifurcation between the 
allegedly contradictory “interest balancing” and “rights maximizing” 
approaches.243 Courts may face barriers to instituting a particular reme-
dy, such as practical infeasibility in light of financial constraints.244 “In-
terest balancing” courts regularly engage in balancing, and the remedial 
effectiveness for victims becomes just one of the factors relevant to the 
balancing process.245 Even “rights maximizing” courts may confront un-
avoidable limits on achieving a perfect remedy, and hence may have to 
balance a range of factors in order to achieve the closest-to-perfect reme-
dy for the victim.246 
Advocates who point to a specific, most effective remedy often base 
their judgments on a normative conception of “most effective.”247 Mul-
tiple remedial goals often exist, and perhaps certain remedial goals are 
prioritized. For example, rights, such as those of equality and non-
discrimination, may be seen as “second-order” rights in the sense that 
they grant equality and non-discrimination in relation to the dominant 
typology of rights.248 On the other hand, as Frank Michelman astutely 
notes, the pendulum of rights hierarchies may well swing in the other 
direction in the case of certain nations.249 Principles of non-
discrimination are ingrained in the fabric of modern South Africa; the 
Constitution that justices of the Constitutional Court of South Africa are 
                                                                                                             
ciples for developing public administration); Richard E. Messick, Judicial Reform: The 
Why, the What, and the How (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.pogar.org/publications/judiciary/messick/reform.pdf (emphasizing the critical 
role the judiciary plays in advancing economic development by securing private property 
rights). 
 243. See generally Gewirtz, supra note 11. But see generally Starr, supra note 1 (ar-
guing for a switch in international criminal courts to “interest balancing” from “rights 
maximizing” and viewing a clear distinction between the two frameworks in the context 
of safeguarding international criminal defendants’ procedural rights). 
 244. See Gewirtz, supra note 11, at 591. 
 245. See id. 
 246. See id. at 592. 
 247. See id. at 619–20 (noting that this may require a ranking of various, competing 
goals—an exercise that rests on normative principles in and of itself). 
 248. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Women’s Status, Men’s States, in ARE WOMEN 
HUMAN? AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUES 1, 1–14 (2006) (arguing that interna-
tional conventions such as CEDAW that grant women equality of rights, while achieving 
some advances, ultimately limit women to what men as the dominant group need, and 
thus are ineffectual at dealing with women-specific issues such as pregnancy). 
 249. See Frank I. Michelman, Reasonable Umbrage: Race and Constitutional Antidi-
scrimination Law in the United States and South Africa, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1378, 1396 
(2004). 
2011] HUMAN RIGHTS AND REMEDIAL EQUILIBRATION 499 
“charged to implement is, beyond all question, committed to deleting the 
stamp of apartheid from South African social, economic, and political 
life.”250 When this hierarchy—or subordination—of rights exists, the 
consequence may well be that the associated remedial goals receive less 
weight than other goals. Nonetheless, multiple legally relevant remedial 
goals can exist and be in tension, and the strategies for completely reme-
dying the associated harms may be at odds. 
Further, where—as in many instances of socio-economic rights litiga-
tion—a class-based lawsuit is brought, the individual litigants themselves 
may have irreconcilable conflicts. Theoretically, a fully effective remedy 
would require that each member of the class of victims receive a com-
plete remedy. However, ongoing problems of evolving membership of a 
class, and different contextual and historical experiences with respect to 
the right (among other considerations) may implicate and prevent a full 
remedy. This may also mean that some persons who suffer a rights viola-
tion may never receive a remedy at all, as the remedial program—for 
example, the coverage of certain illnesses as part of a country’s commit-
ment to the right to health—is instituted after they have suffered the con-
sequences of the rights deprivation, which in this example, may be ill-
ness or even death.251 
Remedial imperfection is, of course, unavoidable.252 Courts must re-
spond to this reality by making choices about how to distribute imperfec-
tions in remedial alternatives. In practice, courts respond through a ba-
lancing process as they determine which goals require assessing the rela-
tive value and harm associated with the lot of legally relevant interests 
and goals to achieve compromise.253 
The balancing exercise is not incongruous with the normative goals of 
the human rights enterprise. Just as there is no perfect remedy, there is 
oftentimes no obvious “human rights” approach. Courts may find some 
level of balancing necessary in order to account for an individual’s cir-
cumstances and for systemic rights violations requiring broader solu-
tions. Many human rights themselves involve such a balancing process. 
Balancing is inherent in the principle of “progressive realization,” 
through which a state must “take steps . . . to the maximum of its availa-
ble resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization 
of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate 
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means . . . .”254 This principle accepts that some rights—like the right to 
health or the right to education—may be difficult to fully achieve in the 
short-term, and that pragmatic, resource-based constraints may limit 
states’ progress. 
Courts, therefore, often balance the normative goals of the right at 
hand with the government’s chosen program of progressively realizing a 
right. In the case of South Africa, the Constitutional Court ultimately 
determines whether the government’s chosen course of conduct is “rea-
sonable” by balancing and weighing the requirement of “progress” in 
realizing rights with the various costs of such progress.255 Such costs 
commonly include not only the economic costs of implementing certain 
solutions—such as improved education, health, housing, or water—but 
also a range of other costs that are more difficult to quantify, including 
opportunity costs of diverted institutional resources; impacts on legitima-
cy and progress and institution-building within other branches of gov-
ernment; public resistance and opposition impacting the legitimacy and 
success of the judicial process; and third party costs to parties beyond 
those directly in the litigation. 
Importantly, this analysis does not simply proceed from right to reme-
dy, wherein a pure ideal of a right is defined, and then a tempered reme-
dy is ultimately offered. What Mazibuko and many other cases make 
clear is that the very nature of the right is implicated by the court’s antic-
ipation of the associated remedy. One may read Mazibuko as an example 
of a Court accepting a less-than-perfect remedy. Yet, under more careful 
analysis, the Constitutional Court’s approach appears to be more nuanced 
and ultimately more balanced. The Mazibuko Court stated, “The fact that 
the state must take steps progressively to realise the right implicitly re-
cognises that the right of access to sufficient water cannot be achieved 
immediately. That the Constitution should recognise this is not surpris-
ing.”256 The Court acknowledged the pragmatic constraints on the im-
plementation of a complete right of access to sufficient water and in so 
doing, narrowed the foundational right of access to sufficient water, and 
it did so with reference to the very Constitution that granted such a right. 
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Mazibuko is, therefore, an example of remedial deterrence in the pres-
ence of practical impossibility. The cost of impossibility in meeting a 
right of access to sufficient water necessarily curbed the very definition 
of the right. The Court’s decision to treat the right in this manner was 
instrumental and critical, not only because of resource constraints, but 
importantly, as a means of maintaining the very legitimacy of the Court 
by not exceeding its institutional and political ability to articulate the 
meaning and implementation of rights. 
The remedy that a court would mandate should a right be found to 
have been violated inherently implicates socio-economic rights. As a 
consequence, the idealized nature or content of the right is inconsequen-
tial, from a practical perspective, when there are institutional factors that 
will limit it. Instead, the right is defined as it is operationalized.257 
2. Rights Incorporating Remedies 
The second way in which remedies influence and are interconnected 
with rights is that the right itself may incorporate a remedy. This is 
commonly seen in prophylactic remedies such as injunctions that order a 
specific course of conduct.258 Rights may be constructed to have a built-
in prophylactic remedy. Again, in the U.S. context, Gewirtz focuses on 
the injunction as an “extraordinary remedial weapon” that “evolved to 
carry out the courts’ agenda, that agenda could not have emerged and 
been taken seriously unless an instrument of equity was at hand to help 
achieve it.”259 Although the basic goal of an injunction is to enjoin the 
enforcement of unconstitutional laws and to prohibit new constitutional 
violations—as well as to eliminate continuing effects of past violations—
in practice, injunctions themselves involve a balancing process.260 In-
deed, a necessary predicate to a court providing an injunctive decree is 
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the balanced determination that “the harm is sufficient to justify the re-
medial costs.”261 
The California prison litigation cases, Plata v. Schwarzenegger and 
Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, are more modern examples of courts defin-
ing a right in a prophylactic manner in order to include a remedy. There, 
the reviewing courts found that the CDCR’s medical services were in-
adequate and in violation of the Eighth Amendment (and other federal 
laws), and the plaintiffs negotiated a stipulation for injunctive relief 
through which the CDCR was required to provide “only the minimum 
level of medical care required under the Eighth Amendment.”262 The 
court thus expanded the prisoners’ rights to medical care to include a 
preventive injunction that ordered the CDCR to provide a minimum thre-
shold of medical care.263 When the court conducted an evidentiary hear-
ing three years after this judicial ruling and found that appalling condi-
tions remained in the CDCR facilities, the court again engaged in a care-
ful balancing act and ultimately ordered that the CDCR medical health 
care delivery system be placed in receivership,264 a rights-remedy inter-
play the Supreme Court will now review.265 
In the foreign context, this relationship between right and remedy was 
also apparent in the socio-economic rights arena in Colombia’s Constitu-
tional Court ruling under Decision T-760 that compelled government 
authorities to modify regulations that caused structural problems in the 
country’s health care system.266 There, the Court ordered that the gov-
ernment update, clarify, and unify health insurance coverage plans, and 
expedite the transfer of resources into the health care system and the 
evaluation and supervision of private companies involved in providing 
health care-related services.267 In so doing, the Court altered the very 
definition of the right to health under the Colombian Constitution to in-
clude this prophylactic remedy that demanded institutional change.268 
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The Constitutional Court of South Africa has also noted that it has 
broad remedial powers to which it is entitled under the Constitution, in-
cluding powers to grant supervisory injunctions in instances where the 
government does not meet its constitutional obligations.269 Interestingly, 
when petitioners before the Court litigate violations of socio-economic 
rights, potential supervisory injunctions themselves may be subject to 
balancing and a court determination that the harm outweighs the costs of 
instituting an equitable injunction.270 
3. Remedies Impacting the Value of Rights 
Lastly, rights are shaped by remedial concerns in so far as the mone-
tary value of a right is oftentimes no more than what a court would pro-
vide should the right be violated. This third consideration is perhaps the 
most obvious. In domestic jurisprudence, this would mean that courts 
would limit their remedies for inadequate prison conditions to only fixing 
those problems that are constitutionally insufficient.271 
The practical value of a right thus becomes its attendant remedy.272 In 
Treatment Action Campaign, the practical value of the right to health 
under the South African Constitution was what the judiciary was willing 
to do once the right was violated—i.e. the value of the order to provide 
nevirapine without discrimination.273 In cases like Mazibuko, on the oth-
er hand, the practical value of the right to water remains unclear because 
the necessary predicate—that there in fact be a rights violation—was not 
found by the Court.274 
V. IMPLICATIONS OF A MORE HARMONIOUS VIEW OF RIGHTS AND 
REMEDIES 
In reexamining human rights and remedies through this new lens, a re-
lationship of mutual dependency and symbiosis becomes evident.275 
From this view, rights and remedies operate together in mutually affirm-
ing ways against the backdrop of a necessarily imperfect geopolitical 
reality. There are several important implications of such an approach. 
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A. Rejecting Rights Essentialism 
First, this new “equilibrated” theory of rights and remedies in the hu-
man rights context calls into question basic notions of “essentialist” 
theory. This Article maintains that at least some human rights are not 
determined by abstract judicial interpretation of legal text, legislative 
history, or values, but rather, include the same pragmatic policy-based 
considerations that have always been acknowledged in the world of re-
medies.276 This result is not entirely surprising, as the entire endeavor of 
defining a “minimum content” to socio-economic rights, as discussed 
above,277 is riddled with such pragmatic and policy-based concerns. 
“Minimum core” proponents from various camps have latched on to a 
variety of norms—including consensus and a notion of practical needs 
for “life,” “survival,” or “dignity”—in order to define a content to this 
minimum core of rights. But, in reality, sub-constitutional policy con-
cerns infiltrate socio-economic rights definitions. Remedial equilibration 
suggests that remedial concerns will routinely infiltrate rights considera-
tions and that rights are inevitably less pure and less ideal than essential-
ist theories acknowledge.278 
As a consequence of this Article’s claims, rights cannot be under- (or 
over-) enforced, despite what many human rights advocates and com-
mentators may believe. The traditional view that pure rights are cor-
rupted and diminished when translated into remedies cannot be correct if 
courts define rights in a practical way with respect to remedies (as they 
arguably do). Rights are defined to operate in the real world, subject to a 
range of limitations. As such, Levinson cleverly and soundly articulates a 
significant insight of remedial equilibration that aptly applies to realizing 
socio-economic rights—that “rights do not spring into existence fully 
formed and self contained, like Athena from the head of Zeus.”279 Mazi-
buko is just one recent example of this, but various other examples ab-
ound, inside and outside the arena of socio-economic rights.280 Judges 
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define rights—be they rights under the U.S. Constitution or the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights—by consider-
ing the tangible world that they themselves live in and its related con-
straints. 
B. Rethinking Institutional Boundaries and the Role of Courts 
Second, a harmonious view of rights and remedies in human rights 
doctrine challenges the traditional view of institutional division of labor, 
which holds that defining rights is the role of courts alone—or at least 
that courts can and should define an irreducible minimum for rights 
(which legislatures can ratchet up)—while remedies are developed 
through multi-branch collaborative processes. Some scholars have tossed 
aside this theory of “court-fixation,” rejecting the overly simplistic no-
tion that constitutional rights are for courts, and courts exclusively, to 
define and place into action.281 Under this view, both courts and legisla-
tures play a role in defining rights, and both do so with consideration of 
remedial limitations.282 For example, if a court decides that the full, ideal 
right of the right to health is unattainable in a timely manner—based on 
practical, political, or other limitations—it may avoid finding a rights 
violation for procedural or other reasons. It may also further explicate the 
scope or content of a certain right as to not include exactly what the peti-
tioners are asking for. In so doing, the court provides lucidity as to the 
content of the specific right. At the same time, when a legislature drafts 
legislation that provides pro forma penalties—for example, heightened 
penalties for health facilities that are found to have discriminated in 
access to health care—then the legislature is prescribing heightened 
damages beyond the actual damages that would otherwise have been 
awarded. Such a statutory regime by the legislative branch no doubt ex-
pands the scope of the right at hand; its practical value is greater based 
on legislative action. 
Similarly, both courts and legislatures define the scope and availability 
of remedies. As described earlier, courts may define rights to include 
prophylactic remedies.283 Or courts may, through remedial deterrence, 
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consider rights and remedies concomitantly as the nature of a right is 
defined with respect to remedial considerations. The legislature may help 
foster a domestic legal regime that makes a right practical in the real 
world. As it fosters and defines the boundaries of such a domestic legal 
regime, it affects the nature of the right that will ultimately be available 
to people. 
While recognizing the roles of other branches of government, courts 
play a critical role in the “equilibration” exercise and are well-situated to 
do so, especially in the human rights context. Courts regularly engage in 
balancing. Although balancing is a normative task, there are limitations 
on judicial abuses of this freedom. One potential limitation is the notion 
that the true benefit of the right and the goal of undoing effects of the 
right’s violation should be given paramount weight. Concomitantly, in-
terests in direct opposition to the nature of the right should not play a role 
in balancing.284 By mediating between the ideal and the real, courts ob-
struct “perfect theories” that idealize general notions of justice or eco-
nomic behavior.285 However, law exists in every-day, messy reality as its 
primary realm.286 As Justice Frankfurter once said of the Constitution, 
courts must read such law with the “gloss which life” puts upon it.287 In 
so doing, courts effectively weigh the compendium of rights and a range 
of costs and constraints. Courts seem particularly well-suited to make 
these inquiries in the human rights context, which are often even more 
justice-focused than other judicial inquiries. 
C. Affirming Judicial Candor and Transparency 
Lastly, having considered the scope of courts’ role in the equilibration 
exercise, considering rights and remedies as necessarily interrelated also 
leads to conclusions about the manner in which courts should undertake 
their role. Specifically, judicial transparency and candor are critical in 
such an approach. Courts have not always been candid about gaps be-
tween rights and remedies.288 Judicial subterfuge is damaging and may 
be seen in certain contexts as a legitimizing device that fails to correct 
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harmful social conditions.289 Gewirtz articulates the concerns that ac-
company a candid detailing of the right-remedy divide: “If judges come 
to feel free about separating issues of remedy from issues of rights, they 
might articulate rights too broadly, by removing from their deliberations 
about the right certain practical constraints that properly play some role 
in defining those rights.”290 
In practice, this may be the growing concern of human rights advocates 
who lament the gap that exists between boldly declared rights and a 
dearth of “rights-realizing” remedies. However, Gewirtz believes that the 
concerns about exacerbating the right-remedy gap may be minimized 
because “the pressures are all in the other direction: Judges will always 
be reluctant to advertise that they are delivering less than the ‘right,’ and 
therefore will be far more likely to trim the right to fit the remedy than to 
exaggerate the right.”291 Gewirtz’s implicit reference to the process of 
rights equilibration acknowledges another benefit of this approach. By 
aligning rights and remedies in a symbiotic relationship, judges close the 
analytical expanse between rights and remedies. Particularly in the inter-
national human rights process, which often threatens the control of a 
state’s political branches, judicial transparency and candor remain criti-
cally important throughout, as a means of legitimizing a court’s actions, 
as well as building a sense of social awareness regarding the practical 
limitations that thwart the attainment of more pure, ideal versions of 
rights. Courts ultimately can assist with institution building by so doing, 
as they can allow citizens to help articulate and understand the content of 
human rights, and especially socio-economic rights, and the pace at 
which those rights can be appropriately realized. 
CONCLUSION 
The concept of remedial deterrence has received considerable academ-
ic attention with respect to understanding U.S. constitutional legal norms 
and, more recently, human rights law as applied by international criminal 
tribunals. The concept recognizes that judges may be less willing or less 
likely to recognize a violation of a right because of pragmatic constraints, 
and because a remedy may seem unviable.292 However, scholars have not 
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extended such insights to the area of human rights and socio-economic 
rights in particular. 
Notwithstanding the lack of attention and the oftentimes reductionist 
arguments that have occupied legal discourse in this space, there is a 
clear relationship between rights and remedies in the human rights arena. 
This Article rejectes rights essentialism and demonstrates the folly of 
solely focusing on defining, for example, socio-economic rights as either 
characterized by a firm and resolute minimum core of rights, versus a 
more flexible, but some would allege ineffectual, “reasonable” govern-
mental course of action. Further, although many commentators have 
worked to characterize and adjudge “strong” versus “weak” forms of 
judicial review, the interplay between human rights and remedies is ac-
tually far more nuanced and resistant to such rigid classifications. For 
example, the highest courts in South Africa and Colombia have taken 
steps toward defining a minimum core of socio-economic rights, order-
ing bold remedial steps and requiring “reasonable” government action, 
respectively.293 Judicial balancing takes place in all remedial determina-
tions, and in many instances it enhances the realization of rights. This 
Article, therefore, rejects simplistic categorization of judicial approaches 
as either “rights maximizing,” or else “interest balancing” and (as certain 
rights advocates would argue) necessarily rights-compromising. 
Finally, the important emphasis for courts and commentators is in 
questioning the stark divide that exists between rights and remedies, de-
spite the inevitable truth that considerations of one intrinsically weigh 
upon the determination of the other. A satisfying and effectual approach 
to adjudicating “human rights” and “human remedies” necessitates a uni-
fied and equilibrated analysis of the two. A more unified and “equili-
brated” approach yields a view of socio-economic rights and remedies 
that holds enormous potential to foster creative and virtuous cycles of 
growth and measurable results in “progressively realizing” socio-
economic rights. 
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